Five January 25 gains that have (so far) survived the counter-revolution
Steve Negus | Egypt revolution scaf As quite a few commentators have gloomily noted, an Egyptian counter-revolution appears to be in full swing. The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces has vowed to step up its use of Emergency Law and demonstrating a willingness to crack down on street protesters, strikers, critics of the military, NGOs who receive foreign funding, and anyone else who might trouble their hold over the country. Newspapers are again being censored. The Interior Ministry seems to have successfully resisted real reform, at least for the time being. Supporters of the revolution are trying to count the tangible achievements of the January uprising and coming up short, sober observers are reminding us that those who create a revolution rarely get to determine its outcome, and some Edmund Burkes are surveying the scene and declaring that they knew all along that the naive youth of Facebook could never seriously shape the course of Egypt's future, except as pawns.
I would agree that the vision of Egypt's future articulated by protesters in Tahrir is still far from being realized. However, they have already accomplished far more than many would give them credit for doing. Some examples:
1) Egypt's media and political political landscape has become vastly more pluralistic. SCAF has been cracking down on the media, but in a very piecemeal fashion, a few pebbles tossed against the torrent of licensings of newspapers and television channels licensed in the first months after Mubarak's departure. Every major political trend in the country has been allowed to form its own political party. This means, among other things that parties have more internal democracy: Islamists no longer have to huddle together under the semi-tolerated protective umbrella of the Muslim Brothers to avoid prosecution for illegal political activity, but have been free to split off into smaller groups that express their discontent with the parent organization.
2) Liberals have established themselves as a real force in Egyptian politics. Electorally, they may not be as organized as the Islamists, but the leftist/liberal secular-leaning youth are the acknowledged heroes of January. Groups like April 6 and the Revolutionary Youth Coalition now have major name recognition, and polls suggest that they are at the very least competitive with the Muslim Brothers. Prior to January, very few people would have mentioned the Islamists and the liberals even in the same breath as political forces of comparable power.
3) Egypt's political discourse has become increasingly liberal. The demands of the January uprising have hardened the consensus that Egypt needs to have a democratically elected government. And we're not talking about the "democratic transition" offered by Mubarak, where Egypt may be allowed to elect their 20 years down the road, if conditions are absolutely perfect -- pretty much everyone has agreed in principle that the next government must be fairly elected under the supervision of an independent judiciary. And with the exception of a few Salafis, pretty much every group insists that the government be "civil" -- ie, not an Islamic state. You may or may not believe that the Muslim Brothers would not establish a theocracy if given the chance. But in order to implement a radical agenda, a would-be radical vanguard party usually needs to pitch itself as offering a major alternative to the current order. Very few Egyptian politicians seem to have calculated that there is a market for religious radicalism.
The revolution also seems to have strengthened the consensus in favor of individual rights -- leading Islamists have acknowledged a right for Muslims to convert out of Islam, for example, while Coptic activists have become more vocal in demanding that the Church should no longer have the capacity to regulate their personal lives, in particular their right to divorce.
4) Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians have become politically active -- not just in the crowds in Tahrir, but in the workplace as well. Egypt was never quite as compliant as it was portrayed to be, and workers, government employees, professionals, tenants, and other aggrieved groups have always staged strikes and demonstrators to further interests. But under Mubarak, the regime was usually able to keep these groups focused on their specific needs and fairly easily appeased with small concessions. Now, workplace organizations are far more militant, and far more likely to mix their own parochial demands with pressure to keep up reforms at a national level. Also, Egyptian institutions from labor unions to al-Azhar have signalled that they will no longer tolerate their leadership being appointed by the state, and insist on autonomy.
5) The calculus of running the country has been changed. No future government can assume, as Mubarak's did, that it can violate its pledges or make an utter mockery of elections, and only a small handful of activists will turn out to protest, outnumbered by the Central Security forces which surround them. No future autocrat can quite as cocky about rigging elections, about promoting a family member as heir, or otherwise ignoring the desires of the Egyptian public.
None of these successes is irreversible. None are cast-iron guarantees of fair and democratic elections. But they are major obstacles in the path of any would-be strongman who wishes to reestablished an entrenched and lasting autocracy.
Reader Comments (7)
Excellent reply to those doom prophets and other "armchair" western analysts who keep claiming the revolution achieved nothing.
Agreed - there are still many, many problems in Egypt but I think we can agree that it is fundamentally a different place from just one year ago.
I agree with the increased plurality of voices in the national discourse, absolutely... but your assessment of Islamist approaches to the idea of a genuinely civil state seems a bit rosy. A civil state in which conservative sharia (e.g., of the MB and to a greater extent Salafi parties) remains the primary source of legislation is not really a civil state, nor can it allow much room for individual, civil liberties. (Note that I'm NOT commenting on the rusty Islam-and-democracy argument, but rather on the question of constitutional law and legislation.) Would we really see a decrease of censorship and an increase in free speech and religious freedom if the MB take 50% of a new parliament? Doubtful.
I am intrigued by the comment about leading Islamists declaring that conversion - from their perspective, apostasy - should be made illegal. This is major shift in what's generally considered a big no-no area for most religious conservatives. Can you give some more details??
Keep up the good work, Issandr.
I am writing from Canada. What I see is the continuation of the appalling treatment of Christians in Egypt. They flee your country by the thousands and seek refugee status in the West. The day Muslims in Egypt take to the streets and ask that Christians in Egypt be granted the same rights as those Muslims enjoy in the West, I will start paying attention to this "revolution". But I don’t hold my breath.
"A civil state in which conservative sharia (e.g., of the MB and to a greater extent Salafi parties) remains the primary source of legislation is not really a civil state, nor can it allow much room for individual, civil liberties."
Sort of. A constitutional article giving a primary role to sharia is the norm in Arab constitutions, and practically speaking doesn't mean much, particularly when balanced with other constitutional guarantees on speech, etc.
"Would we really see a decrease of censorship and an increase in free speech and religious freedom if the MB take 50% of a new parliament? "
You wouldn't see a free society, but maybe an improvement from Mubarak/SCAF. Maybe. The baseline is low.
"I am intrigued by the comment about leading Islamists declaring that conversion - from their perspective, apostasy - should be made illegal"
Abdel Moneim Aboul Futuh said so on prime time Tv http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/439184. As far as I know, no one in the Islamosphere called him out on it.
The argument is not that these statements are any sort of guarantee, but an indicator of the national mood. The MB is trying to act anodyne.
"The day Muslims in Egypt take to the streets and ask that Christians in Egypt be granted the same rights as those Muslims enjoy in the West, I will start paying attention to this "revolution". "
Egyptians regularly protest violence against Christians, although not in as large numbers as one would like. Many significant liberalizing revolutions have taken place in countries, in which the rights granted to minorities, be they 18th century American slaves or 20th century eastern European Roma, leave much to be desired.
Sorry, Steve- I missed the byline and assumed Issandr had posted. Thanks for your response- I had somehow missed Abouel Fotouh's statement about conversion in May.
It is good to see, so many months down the road, that there have been gains made by the protest movement in Egypt that remain in place. On the other hand there is, naturally enough, a counter-revolution that is in full swing. It has been in full swing ever since the regime made the very first concession to the protesters, "compromised" with them, giving them, and the segment of the population they represent, less than they demanded. Elites whose positions within society depend upon the status quo can be trusted to defend as much of that status quo as they can, for as long as they can. Nevertheless, the question becomes what the pro-democracy movement should do now, what with the Military Council starting to backpedal in regards to promised elections and constitutional reforms?
One thing they absolutely must keep focused on is the need to maintain solidarity, both within the secular-liberal movement itself as well as with the labor unions, and also such members of the Islamist parties as they can find common ground with. As for the democracy movement itself, it appears to be in some danger of becoming fragmented and losing it's focus, which is not very surprising, given that the original goal, that of removing Mubarak, has been accomplished. They now face several immediate questions: Should they boycott the Parliamentary elections? Should they form a party and run some candidates? Should they focus instead on the Presidential elections later on? Which presidential candidate should they support, if any? Should they confront the security forces now and make new demands? What should those demands be?
They most important thing is to keep their eye on the most ultimate prize: The final constitution. Whatever happens in the next round of elections, it's the constitution that will direct political life in Egypt for years to come. Everything else they do should be directed toward ensuring that the constitution contains provisions that are essential to a functioning democracy. The single most important element that constitution must contain is ensuring the authentic subordination of the military to the elected government. This subordination must be both legal and real. It must include approval of the entire military budget, not excluding the many various financial and commercial holdings and properties currently controlled by the military.
That is the "make or break" issue confronting Egypt’s democracy movement. Failure to bring the military under civilian control means that the political process will continue to be a sham, a front intended to provide cover for the real elites who will continue to exercise unaccountable control over Egypt's most important resources. This offers a very clear basis on which to evaluate parties and candidates based on their willingness to publicly take a stand on this issue. Yet they shouldn't wait for the elections to take action on this. An "Article 64" movement (because the current constitution contains 63 articles, this would be a hypothetical 64th) would provide a focus for street action now, and put pressure on the Military and their Constitutional Committee to demonstrate their willingness to cede power to an eventual democratically elected government.