More on the counter-revolution

This is going to be a bleak post, taking stock of some of the worrying developments of the last week:

- The re-invocation of Emergency Law, plus redundant, extra-repressive bells and whistles (see Issandr's post) clearly aimed at anybody (the media, unions, NGOs) who might be thinking about challenging the SCAF

- The crack-down on Al Jazeera's live Egypt channel and the general intimidation of the media 

- Rumours that the SCAF will appoint members of the constitutional assembly (rather than have parliament select them), going back on the agreed-to process sanctioned by last March's referendum -- and a dawning realization that presidential elections may not take place till mid-2012

- A judicial and political transition process that remains deeply (deliberately?) muddled, with almost all political parties criticizing the (as yet to be finalized) new electoral law, the new districting plan, the lack of a clear time-table -- to little avail. 

- A security apparatus that remains resistant to all change -- except for a name change -- and incapable of facing the country's quite real crime wave

- An opposition and protest movement that is more fragmented than ever, still stuck playing Tahrir politics 

Of course the activists who have been skeptical of the army from day one will say: Why are you surprised?

It's not that here at Arabist we haven't seen the counter-revolution coming all along; but I for one had hoped that it would be more greatly constrained, by international pressure and above all by domestic expectations and public opinion. As is, the most "deafening silence" these days is that of the many Egyptians, who -- presented with the stale old choice between "stability" and "chaos" -- seem to have decided that the generals need an even free-er hand to put the house in order. 

Seven months after Mubarak was forced out of power, Egypt is being run by an authoritarian, unelected and unaccountable executive that resorts to the same tired security logic and the same insidious allegations of foreign manipulation and -- perhaps most disturbingly of all -- has created a greater layer fear and denial around any critical discussion of its actions than the late Mubarak regime had. 

Add to that an American administration that would rather find its accommodation with the status quo than support risky but real democratization; a civil society on the defensive; and political groups who are continue making demands and offering advice to the SCAF that it routinely ignores.

This is not to say that I don't still have faith and hope in Egyptians' desire for change or ability to rally. But let's just say we're at a low point. The only wild card at the moment is the threatening storm of labour unrest, withstudents, doctors and teachers all initiating or planning major strikes. 

Comments

[Non-Arab Arab]

Ursula, good points, but I think you have missed one other VERY big wild card: Egypt's rapidly dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Since the revolution broke out, literally half of the surplus that was built up over the prior decade has evaporated. At this pace, the entire surplus will be gone (leaving around $15 billion versus over $35 billion on the eve of the revolution) by around mid-2012. And given there is no major recovery in the economy, that labour unrest is gaining steam, and that the SCAF clearly has no intention of making the sorts of changes that could stabilize that situation, Egypt is going to face a liquidity crisis in the next year or so. Unable to pay for imports, needing to ration capital, potentially facing massive fresh inflation, and increasingly unable to pay the nation's bills, whoever is in charge at that point is going to face a major crisis with unpredictable outcomes. Right now in one form or another it looks like the SCAF and other old regime elements will still be in charge. Maybe they'll manage to deflect the blame to revolutionary forces and deepen their grip on power amidst even more 'deafening silence'. Or maybe that will be a final 'throw the bums out' moment that topples the SCAF and opens up even greater battles between ancien regime forces and revolutionaries to the benefit of the latter. Hard to say, but I think the now seemingly inevitable liquidity crisis is one of the largest wild cards out there right now and is receiving remarkably little attention. I'm sure the SCAF have their eye keenly on it, but rather than quickly engage in genuine rapid root and branch reform, they've clearly chosen to run with their old regime mentality to try to stop the economic bleeding and maintain control. It won't work and what comes next is highly unpredictable.