On Dan Brumberg's Egypt essay
Issandr El Amrani | Egypt Dan Brumberg has an essay in The Atlantic about Egypt's transition. It's a good read and has some very perceptive insights. But it also has a couple of flaws I see as fundamental.
One is about his retelling of what only recently became known as the "Constitution First" camp, and which is already receding after this week's protests, where many activists with impeccable democratic credentials told me the whole Constitution First affair was now over and that revolutionary forces accepted the sequencing of the transition. He writes that story as if there was a camp calling itself constitution first back in February, which is not true, even if there were those that proposed (such as ElBaradei) the creation of a constitutional assembly before elections. Nor does he touch upon the undemocratic nature of ElBaradei (and others') proposal for a constituent assembly or even a transitional presidential council whose members would be appointed, or self-selected, rather than elected.
The second is related, in that Brumberg seems to have identified good guys (liberals) and bad guys (the military, former NDP officials, most Islamists) in his narrative of the transition. This is evident in that he gives (good) advice to what he calls the Constitution First Camp (which, again, may hardly be a relevant name anymore). But is he not too concerned about which camp Americans would like to see "win" here? If there is a clean election in the fall, and Islamists do well, why would that be undemocratic? Like it or not we are in the logic of electoral democracy here, and if the process is irreproachable one should accept the outcome. We continue to see the dangers of not taking this approach in Palestine, where the international community decided that global standards for electoral democracy did not apply to Hamas.
Reader Comments (11)
The traffic metaphor, seriously? But he has a point on the fact that Egypt's political forces are - or think they are - well organized and are not willing to just step back and negotiate the rules of the game first. I don't agree that elections should be postponed though. The SCAF should be pressed to show what it has done or to lay out a plan for electoral monitoring before the start of Ramadan and all parties should agree on the basic rules of the electoral game and no-go areas for a new constitution and that's that. Waiting for a full consensus on the constitution before elections may be rather like waiting for Godot and might create a temptation on the part of the SCAF or others to simply hand-pick a constituent assembly that will preserve a Turkish-style role for the military.
I agree that he's a bit behind the curve, but I would disagree that the constitution issue is over for good. It was suddenly put aside in the last week to focus on security form and speedier trials, but when the dust settles from this latest round and the political organizing comes back to the fore, the battle is bound to return.
It was one of the military's quickly ignored concessions to set up a committee as a kind of compromise: principles before, final constution after elections. It may all turn out to be another talking shop, but for the people I've talked to the constitution issue is not done. The goal posts may have shifted a little, but it's still there.
I'm still having trouble getting past the traffic metaphor, especially after he said there were so many others out there.
SP, I'm very curious to hear your account of how the "Turkish-style" role in electoral politics came to be. I don't have a single lucid explanation of that myself, but think that the first coup says a great deal about Turkey's electoral-democratic history. Your thoughts?
One thing to note is that Brumberg probably submitted his piece in June or even May. The Atlantic requires a long lead time. So not entirely fair to beat up on him for being behind the curve on the "constitution-first" issue. Besides, if "constitution-first" was dead, why did the SCAF feel the need to address it in al-Fangary's statement yesterday?
I really have a tough time seeing Constitution First continue its campaign at this point. It should really focus on taking up the SCAF's offer of a document of pre-constitutional guarantees, with the big stumbling block probably being how to make it binding (other than sheer moral force.)
I also think we might be over-estimating the performance of Islamists in the elections. The half-PR half-district system may return surprises, and the FJP people I speak to are still very confused about what to do. In district races the Salafists will make a dent in the MB's performance. Nationally I think it will be tough for Islamists combined to score higher than 40%.
Abu Ali — I thought about the delay re: The Atlantic's publication lead time. But regarding al-Fangary's announcement yesterday, I think he raised (even though it was no longer an issue coming from Tahrir) to make the concession of a pre-constitution agreement on principles, and perhaps to highlight existing divisions.
Joseph, I don't know enough Turkish political history to really say, but think it's significant that in Turkey, as in Egypt, the transition to modern politics was through "revolutions from above," i.e rebellious and reformist military officers - hard to get the bastards back to the barracks when they come to be seen as modernizers and even popular heroes. Ataturk's charisma probably helped keep the image of the Turkish military somewhat burnished too. You're probably right about coup following coup - Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt..(well hopefully not the case in Egypt).
Issandr, do you really think the Islamists will score 40% at the national level? If they do that's a plurality and would be a big deal - my own gut says nowhere above 30% esp with the lack of discipline and splits in the MB now. Will be interesting to see how many follow Habib to the Nahda party once tickets are handed out in the FJP and there are disappointments.
SP - I see Islamists as the three MB parties + two Salafist parties + Wasat.
Ah OK. Do they hate each other's guts enough at this point to refuse a post-electoral alliance I wonder or will they do a grand reconciliation when they realize no-one got much of the vote individually.
" If there is a clean election in the fall, and Islamists do well, why would that be undemocratic?"
Of course, it would not be undemocratic. The key question is how Islamists would react to a victory: would they see it as an opportunity to simply impose their cultural, religious or political agenda on other groups, or as an opportunity to carve out a wider consensus respecting the rights of other groups, including those who lose elections. As for non-Islamists, they need to organize to ensure a level of competition and bargaining. Democracy becomes undemocratic in the absence of checks and balances.