Egypt: the military's gambit
Issandr El AmraniAs most of you know by now, the Egyptian army beat up protestors on Friday night, with some apparently donning masks to hide their identity and using electric cattle prods. The army subsequently apologized, and then once again stressed the need for everyone to go home, and then spoke of the usual foreign dangers against the sanctity of the Egyptian people, etc.
Sarah Carr as always has an account that captures the mood, read it in full:
One protestor was in tears, shouting, “the army is hitting us! The army is hitting us!” There has long been popular adoration of, and respect for the army, reinforced since the tanks rolled in on the 28th. It will be interesting to see whether last night’s episode in any way shakes this, or whether it rallies more people around the demand that Shafiq resigns.
The army has already subjected us to a barrage of statements on Facebook about the incident, like a teenage girl discussing boy problems. Statement no. 22 was particularly odd. Entitled “apology” it then said that the “encounters” between the military police and the great Egyptian people were “unintentional” (“OMG I didn’t mean to hurt you babe!!!! Luv u 4ever xoxoxoxo)
Statement no. 24 meanwhile goes on about how the army has got our back but there exist fears of “infiltrating elements” trying to corrupt the revolution who threw stones and bottles at the armed forces (“How cld u treat me like this I hate u you’ve broken my heart you bastard!!
(((((”).
This is all very Mubarak and must desist.
I'm not sure how long the general Egyptian public can maintain the bizarre idea that the army is so great. This is the army that took power in a coup in 1952 and ended political pluralism, lost tons of wars after that and continued to justify its predation on the national budget despite not having had to fight anyone since 1973 (if you exclude the Libyans very briefly in the late 1970s and those field hospitals sent to Iraq and Kosovo in the 1990s), that has absolutely no experience policing and yet is getting military police and military intelligence to carry out that function (when their primary job has been keeping an eye on rank and file). It is the army that put Mubarak in place in six days after the assassination of Sadat, and now runs things through a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that is headed by Mubarak loyalist Mohammed Hussein Tantawi (in place since 1992) and a government headed by former chief of the Air Force Ahmed Chafiq (who considers Mubarak his "spiritual father.") Not to mention, of course, the army that owned the land in Tagammu al-Khamiss outside of Cairo that was sold for the spectacular profits by several real estate developers, or the army that continues to employ conscripts as free labor in various places.
In answer to the question that started the preceding paragraph, I think actually the army can maintain that illusion for a long time. Eleven years in Egypt have taught me to never underestimate the power of the ERDF — the Egyptian Reality Distortion Field. It is a surprisingly flexible and adaptable weapon, even in the face of the most stubborn facts. Part of this is information manipulation, of course — it helps that the military has just appointed one of its own to run the Egyptian Radio and Television Union — but also a certain amount of political caution. Hossam el-Hamalawy, never one to hold on to illusions about power, wrote after the clash with the army:
Everyone is rightly upset about what the army did in Tahrir Square last night. Let’s remember, however, the military already moved against peaceful protesters in Suez, and is accused of involvement of torture and arrest of hundreds during the uprising. And almost everyday there is a statement from the army warning strikers and protesters, coupled with an orchestrated media campaign in both state and private TV channels discrediting labor strikes and renewed protests in Tahrir. What happened last night should not come as a shock.
If Mubarak’s regime was corrupt (and it was), then why do we treat the military institution, which provided the backbone of his dictatorship, as “neutral” or “pure”? The leadership of this institution, namely the generals of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces are part of Mubarak’s regime. And any real change would affect their privileges and control.
We cannot and will not carry up arms against the army. I salute and support all the efforts for resuming the protests in Tahrir, including the one planned for today at 2pm. But still, the most effective weapon is the mass strikes.
Mass strikes is precisely what the army fears the most, along with the Egyptian elite for which it represents both economic disaster and the rise of mob rule. Dealing with 30 years of socio-economic neglect is one of the biggest challenge Egypt faces, and — considering the limited means to carry out an immediate improvement — the country's interim rulers have to sell a message of hope and confidence. So far, so-so.
A body of evidence is accumulating about human rights abuses by the armed forces since January 28, the day it came out onto the streets. A kind of detention/interrogation room appears to still be in existence at the Egyptian Museum for use by military police, and those taken there report being beaten and sexual harassed. None of this is being pursued by the authorities, since the authorities are the military.
There is little alternative that most Egyptians would find palatable to the army. But there are methods to constrain its power and pressure it to ensure as optimal a transition as possible. The most significant one is the media: by keeping the spotlight on the army's behavior, it raises the costs of repression and keeps it checked. The other is power-sharing with civilians. People like Muhammad ElBaradei have advocated the creation of a transitional council to replace the presidency that would include one military figure and two or more civilians. The realist critique of this is that the military figure would be much more powerful and able to simply over-rule the civilians. But this does not take into account the civilians' willingness to make the internal debates of the council a matter of public debate. ElBaradei should be commended for being one of the few opposition leaders not to have taken a reflexive "we love the military" attitude, a reminder that even if he's been politically inneffective, at least he's intellectually coherent.
We are quickly headed to a time when the military will have solidified its legitimacy to the extent that it will be much harder to pressure. I wager (along with some smart observers I've discussed this with) that the turning point will come within two months if the referendum on constitutional amendments takes place as expected. Although the amendments may signal some great improvements, such as putting in term limits on the presidency, but will also deliver the interim military government a clear public mandate. You can expect millions of Egyptians voting overwhelmingly in favor of the amended constitution, delivering a clear sign of public support for the transition model chosen by the military. It will be difficult for opposition groups to then challenge the army, which can point to this popular mandate as the source of its legitimacy.
In conclusion, since I'm American and not Egyptian, I would reiterate my earlier call for the suspension of US aid to the Egyptian military until a credible civilian government is restored. There would be no clearer indication that what the Obama administration, in calling for a genuine transition in Egypt, is itself being genuine. But, in all likeliness, it is probably mostly interested in keeping a channel of communications with the military and a reliable ally in a military-dominated Egypt. Smart democracy advocates should put pressure the US government to take a closer look at the Egyptian military's behavior, and thus restrict its room for maneuver in the public debate over US-Egyptian relations.
Update: I wanted to add the following passage from Max Rodenbecks' recent NYRB piece, which I earlier linked to, and offers some food for thought about the military:
As in Tunisia, Egypt’s army stepped in to maintain order during the unrest, and honorably refrained from using force. Eighteen generals of the military high command now officially run the country, having suspended the constitution and disbanded parliament. They have met with opposition figures, declared support for the revolution’s aims, celebrated its martyrs, pledged a transition to civilian rule within six months, and appointed a commission to revise electoral rules. They have also promised to pursue cases of corruption involving former officials, several of whom are under investigation or in custody.
Yet the military’s long legacy as a privileged pillar of the outgoing regime still provokes wariness. Some fear that the army’s haste to hold elections without a more thorough constitutional overhaul suggests a desire to preserve a system whereby a powerful presidency has shielded the military from civilian scrutiny. They also worry that too fast a transition would benefit both the Muslim Brotherhood and the former ruling party, the only political organizations with an entrenched street presence, at the expense of newer, less experienced political forces. Instead, prominent intellectuals have counseled the creation of a stronger, more representative interim government, capable of overseeing a longer and more measured period of transition.
Much of Egypt’s nomenclatura consists of current and former army officers like Mubarak himself. Their inbuilt resistance to truly revolutionary change can be seen in the high command’s reluctance, so far, to countenance any investigation of the Mubarak family, or to outline a comprehensive vision for reform. They have yet to abolish Egypt’s notorious emergency law, or to release remaining political prisoners. Perhaps most disturbingly, the military has charged the last cabinet appointed by Mubarak with continuing to run the daily affairs of government. In short, it is not yet clear whether the generals’ understanding of “democracy” is closer to Mubarak’s than to the hopes so vividly expressed by their people.
Reader Comments (7)
This is one of the worst pieces I have read about eh Egyptian military in my life. I am Egyptian, and I am a believer in our military. This is an extremely delicate situation nowadays, so whoever and wherever you are, sparking something between the people and the military at this point is extremely dangerous and wrong: so if you don't have anything productive to say, don't fire it.
In response to: "This is the army that took power in a coup in 1952 and ended political pluralism, lost tons of wars after that and continued to justify its predation on the national budget despite not having had to fight anyone since 1973" I'd say:
Since the coup, Egypt has been attacked 2 times (1956 by UK, France, Israel. 1967 by Israel) The first was just 4 years after the coup when Egypt was completely broke, army was completely out of form and still wounded from the War in 1948 and the malfunctioning weapons that blew them instead of the enemy. This offensive didn't accomplish anything due to international intervention and certainly it wasn't at all a defeat.
Just before 1967, the Egyptian army was part of the war for the unification of Yemen, and as you can see, Yemen is unified, which means it was a victory. In 1967, arrogance played its role in the 6-day war defeat when the political leadership failed to believe the confirmed intel that said Israel (far under-developed militarily at that time in comparison to Egypt) would attack, and gave the exact plans. The war of attrition followed this defeat, which was basically a collection of highly successful military operations including the sinking of the Eilat destroyer and the bombing of the Beit Shefa' destroyer, Bat yam military cargo ship and the military dock of the Eilat harbour.
In 1973, and after a huge successful plan of strategic deceit, the Egyptian military (hugely under-equipped but from basic weaponry) along with the Syrian counterpart launched an attack on Sinai and Golan. The plan was to capture 12 kms deep in Sinai to start moving the negotiations that would then lead to getting back all of Sinai. In comparison to Israel, and against the HUGE support it had from the US that even included an air bridge of supplies during the war, Egypt has accomplished its plan to the full within the first 4~5 days of the war. The Suez crisis after that was in reality, no big issue because the Israeli soldiers would have never been able to advance or develop the offensive, as they were besieged (Egyptians could have bombed them and finished the deal, except that they would risk the lives of the other Egyptians in the smaller circle) which makes the Suez crisis no more than a last minute goal by a soccer team that was losing 5-0, and just modified the score to 5-1 before the final whistle. This by all means would mean a victory by the Egyptian side.
On the intelligence level, Egyptian intelligence proved superior in many cases. Including the very successful operations of sinking the Israeli red-sea oil rig in Abidjan, long before it reaches its destination; the operations of Ahmed el Hawan, Samia Fahmy, Rifaat el Gammal (AKA Jack Bitton: An Egyptian Muslim man who lived his life as a practicing Jewish Israeli business man, and spied for Egypt from inside Israel for 23 years. The first, and most successful operation the Egyptians intelligence ever made) and Ashraf Marwan who's truth is yet to be discovered.
In the 1980's and 1990's, Egyptian military has formed around a large percentage of the international forces that fought in the gulf war 2; making it the second largest contributer after the US, and the most active.
I certainly don't see the "TON" you mentioned in your article. All in all the military has been part of 6 wars (7 if you consider Libya) since the coup of which, it was defeated only once (or twice if you still wanna consider 1956 that they didn't fight). And about the justification of the "predation on national budget": one of the conditions for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty is that both has to be militarily equivalent at any given time, so whenever the IDF develops, the Egyptian army has to develop and since the IDF's food is war, Egypt has to keep developing its military continuously.
Thank you for that long list of excuses mr no-link-to-who-you-are-or-any-of-your-past-views "engai". At a certain point, decades of failures are more than just a long list of explanations, they are a clear trend.
They are not excuses, they are factual information. Military now might be working or reforming slowly, but reforms are taking place anyways. Some clashes and arguments happened between them and the protesters last Friday, this doesn't at all mean they are like the police or security forces. I would certainly believe they were individual events, as I said, I'm Egyptian and I know Egyptians ain't too perfect to the point where they would never ever drive an argument with authorities.
Mistakes have been committed, yeah, but the apology came in the same day. This doesn't mean we come and write non-factual nonsense like this just for the sake of offending. The whole scene is electrocuted, and the military is use to high disciplines... they are not kidding; any clashes with them now would mean a complete state failure.
As for my history of comments... I never commented on Arabist before, usually because I don't read it that much, but when I read something BS like this, I have to speak!
Dear Engai, When you read something, the first rule of thumb is: “Consider the source”. In this case, the writer admitted that he is not Egyptian. So, he is not interested in what happens in Egypt. Rather, he wants to look like a “smart expert” who has a vision and the ability to predict the future of a whole nation.
Proof: he described himself and those who agree with him as “smart observers” while describing the Egyptian public’s admiration of the army as a “bizarre idea”, neglecting to mention that the whole world was and still is in awe of the Egyptian army whose top commanders refused to obey orders to use live ammunition against the demonstrators. Ahhh, selective memory is a wonderful thing, isn’t it?
Conclusion: Source not interested in Egypt; source interested in promoting himself.
That said, let’s examine what an Egyptian (who has one eye on the new road, one eye on those who are leading this new journey and both hands on his/her heart) would view the current situation.
An Egyptian sees that for the first time the army has formed a civilian council representing ALL sectors to discuss amending the constitution. An Egyptian sees that the assets of the pillars of the previous regime have been frozen. An Egyptian sees that icons of the previous regime are brought on charged, indicted and are now in prison.
An Egyptian sits from 6 PM to 4 AM the following day watching a 4-hour open-discussion, interactive TV program with the military council (unprecedented in history), takes notes, memorizes answers, & questions the members of the council the following week to deliver on their announced promises. An Egyptian demands explanations, actions, corrections, & apologies and for the first time in history gets all that and more from the military council. An Egyptian watches closely, cautiously, and remains optimistic because he/she has everything to lose if this doesn’t work out.
However, Egyptians must also give credit where credit is due. So, when the non-Egyptian, smart observers, make profound revelations such as: “The current military council is made up of the same officers of the 1952 revolution”, an Egyptian MUST immediately deliver this new information to the millions of Egyptians who were sleeping on their ears and didn’t know this fact until the “smart observers” got their “Eureka” moment.
Although I’m not a big fan of Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, he was right when he observed, “"I see nothing new in Egypt. Egyptians have made history as usual!" That, my dear, is our lot in life. “make history”…… we are in the business of making history… Ahhh, tough job, but someone’s gotta do it! And we are it! So, while history is being shaped, you cannot expect everyone, especially non-Egyptian smart observers, to have a full grasp of it. Their children will be able to see the full picture when they learn about it in schools.
I’d like to acknowledge all the Egyptians (and my dearest friend Joe) who were in their late teens and early 20s in 1952, those professionals who were starting their lives full of hope & immediately rolled up their sleeves and leaped into the new arena to build & develop their country. Those brave hearts who had their hopes dashed and their dreams crushed……. Some even had their lives terminated and their families ruined. I want to tell this generation, “Don’t worry. We hear you! We know how devastating it was to have your hands tied behind your backs, your feet shackled, & your mouths gagged while you watched your most precious mother drown in a whirlpool. We hear you. We know your disappointment and frustration!! Heavens knows you never let us forget it! (Egyptian nagging is of epic proportions) It is because of what you went through that this generation is doing all it can to avoid a repetition of what happened. No one can possibly fathom the extent of your fear of hope right now, for no one has been more disappointed by hope more than you were. But this generation swore not to have your experience repeated. So, while it is harsh of this generation to ask you to have faith in it, all what they are asking is: “Please wish us well; push us ahead; stop your negativity & predictions of gloom and doom. Watch, instruct, encourage, and pray for us.”
My comments and objections were about the way the article is addressed, and the errors that filled it. I have noticed the name of the writer, and got the idea first hand of how he/she is not Egyptian... however I will not go with your label "smart observer", certainly because I don't see the "smart" part. If anybody wants to "observe" something and report it, he/she has to have a valid ground and sum of historic facts to support him/herself, not just come and blurp, and then expect the people to excuse his/her lack of knowledge.
The words of Berlusconi were nothing more than a cheer, everybody knows he doesn't observe anything and we certainly knew it was history in the making right from the start.
As for your friends, I am sorry to hear it, but we all knew people from that time, and we know exactly what they've seen and how they lived. I would just like to point out that it was the third republic in France that made the France we know today, accomplishing something from the first time is utopia-dreaming.
Engai,
I really can't believe you cite the Egyptian intervention in Yemen as an example of success. And while the crossing of 1973 is certainly a great moment in 20th-century military history, it hardly redeems the colossal failure of 1967. Being the victim of these wars rather than the aggressor is hardly important, either.
Look, I know there is a lot of pride in Egypt about the military. I happen to believe it's largely misplaced and mostly the result of propaganda. My opinion doesn't really matter since I'm not Egyptian. But I hardly think the only reason I have that opinion is because I'm engaged in self-promotion — I don't get much out of having that opinion, do I, Hala? And I certainly wish Egypt well, but that does't mean I'll see everything with sunny optimism.
As for "smart observers" - I don't like using vague terms either. But the conversation was confidential. The remark that the constitutional referendum will give a new mandate to the military still holds, dispute that if you like.
Dear Arabist:
It is sweet of you to respond. You didn't live in Egypt after 1967, it seems. You don't know the jokes about the army at that time & how officers and soldiers were reluctant to wear their uniforms on the streets because they were constantly ridiculed. Egyptians might be kind, sweet, & funny. But one thing they are not is "Gullible".
Yet, the pride in the Egyptian military is not misplaced (for the most part). BUT this pride doesn't mean that we wanted this military council. We didn't and we still don't. However, even you remarked in your article that there is little alternative. And there really is little alternative.
As for my self promotion comment. My dear, I really don't know what all those self-appointed experts get out of it, and I won't venture to guess. But, of course you are entitled to your opinion. I'm saying that your opinion is the common opinion we hear in the Western media. It is based for the most part on "the best indicator of future behavior is past behavior". As a general rule, this thinking is correct. However, there are indications in this particular situation that show otherwise. Nonetheless, chances of a revolution taking the wrong turn are always high. That's what every Egyptian knows. That is why you see the vigilance & the refusal to give up. As a compromise, the gatherings are scheduled for Fridays only & there is constant questioning & constant demands for accountability. That in my opinion is a good sign.
As for the "smart observers". My objection was to the word "smart". I really wasn't asking "who are those people". I don't care who they are. Whoever they are, I don't think that they are necessarily smarter than those who are leading the change in Egypt now. Nothing you (or they) said is new or unheard of. As I said above: no big revelation; no huge surprise in "military rule = bad idea". We know. Been there. Done that. Not stupid! And again, just to reiterate lest I might not have been clear enough, No, you are not smarter than us, thank you very much :-)
As for your remark about "military solidifying power" after the referendum, I did as a matter of fact dispute that with the friend who sent me the link to your article. I also promised him to fly across the continent to Canada, knock on his door, and the second he opens the door, I'll enjoy saying, "Man! I told you so!" :-) You guessed it: he is one of the "smart" ones who agrees with you, not like poor deluded folks like me :-) I'll also return to your blog & do the same with you. As we say in Egypt, "Time {will be the judge} between us".
Finally, I do apologize if I was a bit harsh in my comments. I just find "experts in Egyptian affairs" irritating. They take too many liberties in their opinions. I personally wouldn't be so adamantly certain about the outcome of anything in any foreign country. I've lived in Turkey, for example, studied there, have family there, but I would never take the liberty of guessing what might or might not happen there. Sure enough, they surprised us all by changing the constitution to remove the military as "the protector" of the secular state. Who would have thought this could ever happen in Turkey, of all places! But it did.