This isn't 1952, but Egyptian democrats should still be wary
Steve Negus | #jan25 Egypt Military A despised autocrat is forced to abdicate, a military junta takes power, jubilation in the streets of Cairo -- maybe we've seen it all before, 60 years ago, and it didn't work out so well.
"Whereas some predicted as recently as Thursday that Egypt was moving forward, with the rise of the Military Command Council, Egypt seems to have reverted to 1952," writes Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the Washington Post. He argues that the military's coup will take away the protest movement's momentum, and allow the forces of the status quo to control the transitional process.
There is certainly a danger that the military will attempt to pull a Leopard, creating the illusion of change so that things stay the same -- and reports that the military is warning against strikes are frighteningly reminiscent of the Free Officers' brutal crackdown on workers in Kafr al-Dewar in August of 1952. However, there are also a number of key differences between the situation now and the situation sixty years ago, which I think will make it very difficult for the military to simply ditch Mubarak and keep the system in place.
1) The military did not depose Mubarak on its own initiative, but because a mass protest movement had made the country ungovernable. Senior officers presumably also had to worry about mutinies in the ranks if the situation continued to disintegrate. While there was widespread opposition to the Free Officers in 1952-56, there is no equivalent to today's network of youth and other opposition groups, with a more or less unified set of demands, who were able to bring the country to a halt and could do so again.
2) The Free Officers cast themselves as the opponents not just of the king, but of the entire Egyptian political order -- including several political parties which had held power at various points. In 1952, it was still possible to see one-party rule as a viable alternative to a bickering, corrupt, ineffectual parliamentary system. Thus, when the Officers started to ban parties, it could be seen as a natural extension of their revolutionary goals, rather than a betrayal of them. Egypt's Supreme Council today however has one mandate, and one mandate only: introduce genuine democracy. It has acknowledged that mandate by pledging to return Egypt to civilian rule, and by offering elections in six months.
3) The corruption and ineffectualness of Egypt's governments were only one cause of the pre-1952 discontent. Many Egyptians felt just as strongly about restoring national sovereignty by expelling the British from the Canal Zone, and about the inequitable distribution of land in the countryside. Thus, the Nasser government could call itself a "revolution" by pressuring the British to withdraw and by promising land reform, without necessarily delivering better governance. In contrast, the Supreme Council does not have any quick and dirty means of gaining itself legitimacy, other than following through on its pledges to relinquish power.
This is not to say that there is no danger of the military perpetuating its rule. Nostalgia for dictatorship can set in awfully fast, particularly if there is a sense of economic instability (caused, say, by widespread strikes) or a spike in crime (caused, say, by the demoralization and delegitimization of the police force). Egyptian democrats have a difficult task ahead, keeping the pressure on the military without stirring up longing for a more stable if stagnant autocracy. This time, however, they have the power of a revolution behind them, rather than have it as a weapon that could be used against them.
Reader Comments (5)
Interesting analysis, somewhat allaying my fears. Seen from afar and by someone who doesn't know the situation well, one of the first issues will be how the military deal with the continued pressure and scrutiny of the civil society. Dislodging and beating recalcitrant protesters in Tahrir Sq. doesn't bode well. How can or should the civil society react to that?
What about strikes? How will the military react to these?
Both these issues seem to already have the potential to divide the ere united #jan25 movement. At least in twitterland one can already see incompatible positions develop. If the military settle for a stifling but non-lethal repression, will the demonstrations reconvene? how weakened in comparison to a week ago? Can the democratic movement stay somewhat united or will the military manage to divide them?
Shouldn't the military violently (albeit without fatalities) removing demonstrators from Meydan Tahrir call people back there? If not, where should the line be drawn? How many different lines will be drawn that translate into #jan25 demonstrators divisions. Is unity lost? Is it possible again?
Just a few questions coming to my mind, quite possibly completely out of touch with the real issues.
The last few weeks events gave people around the world immense hope. This is not only of domestic importance, it is also about everyone's future possibilities of freedom in this ever more Big Brotherly world.
Pardon my skepticism, but I do not believe people willingly act against their own self interest. If, as has frequently been alleged, the military (especially at the top) is as corrupt as the "ancien regime" was, it will not want to risk a truly civilian government prying into the military's financial activities. Thus, to protect themselves, the military brass will want to assure that they have another one of their own (Omar Suleiman?) as the head of the government -- whether he is installed by the High Council or "elected" in one of Egypt's famous 98% landslides. The civilians have already missed their opportunity to insist that the transition be in their hands rather than in the hands of those who have an interest in perpetuating the status quo.
I'll grant that you wouldn't expect the officers to act against their own interests, but they also presumably have a stake in the economy as a whole (hence the concern over strikes) and in the reputation of the military. They may also be divided amongst themselves, and concerned about the loyalty of units further down the chain of command. They may well have milked the system for money as well, but it's fairly difficult to prove this in court, and they may be calculating that following through on their pledges is the least risky course of action. No guarantees of course -- but I think the protesters also have to be wary of not overplaying their hand, and it would have been difficult to sustain the occupation of Tahrir after Mubarak's resignation.
In private emails my army officer friend (his source is: A general in the Supreme Army Council) has been providing me with information several hours before World News or even Twiter news broke on the Internet that see below
and told me yesterday febr 14 that Mubarak is still in Sharm el Sheikh calling daily and still meddling in the supreme army council political tactics.
I copy what he wote me on Thu, February 10, 2011 1:04:01 PM
and want the world to know :
Mubarak left 2 hours ago and what happened: (he:Mubarak)
1- He made a written speech to transfer all presidential authorities to his VP omar soleiman
2- He sent a copy to the Minister of defense who was not pleased with it but he didn't mention it (He believed that omar soleiman must work under his supervision not vice versa)
3- After he made the recorded address to the Nation he went to his plane and toke off after 30 minutes
4- The General Sami Anan efforts to make the army breakup was helped by the Minister of defense unpleasant feelings, so they broke up....yes they did it and refused the whole speech.
5- They called the high army council (which they control totally) and made it a No. 1 statement which was said by one of the council on national TV with interpretations that VP Soleman and PM Shafeek works under us and the person (yes they said that) doesn't represent the country
On febr 11 he wrote me
General Sami Anan accompanied Mubarak to the plane AFTER he agreed under army pressure to give the power to the army and not to Soleiman
On febr 12 he wrote me
There was a seniority issue because General Tantawe and the Minister of defense is senior over VP Soleiman and so Mubarark returned with guards to the presidential palace the next day using 3 military helicopters and landed inside the (Heliopolis) palace to solve the problem, but general Tantawe refused and insisted and threatened Mubarak saying that the army wiould take other measures against him (Mubarak), who in turn refused to resign in public on state TV
and Mubarak forced VP soliman to tell the world that Mubarak had resigned and Mubarak left the palace again then after Mubarak was in the air on his way back to Sharm , VP Omar Soleiman announced with an ashen face the famous short statement
"In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate, citizens, during these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through, President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down from the office of president of the republic and has charged the high council of the armed forces to administer the affairs of the country,May God help everybody."
He also wrote me about the reason and confusion well before we even heard the recorded speech of the evening Mubarak was supposed to step down and then changed his mind at the last moment
Whereas the analysis above makes sense and I am totally convinced that the army wants to be off the streets as soon as possible, I find it impossible to believe that they will concede to a civilian AND democtraic state for 2 reasons:
1) Loss of power: under the Mubarak rule, they had a say in all civilian matters (ex. allowing technologies such as GPS, heights of buildings in industrial cities, location of tourist resorts, mass transportation projects.. etc.). Moreover, they have undisclosed budgets and unlimited access to information. Why would they genuinly want to abandon all this and have a civilian government that will challenge their authority, question their budgets and manage their priorities for them?
2) Parliamentary nation: under the Mubarak regime and previous ones as well, the president had unlimited powers, which means that if you held a gun to the president's head (which they literally did) you held the whole nation under control. If a new democratic constitution is put forward, chances are power will be distributed between Parliament and president (maybe even a prime minister and the judicial system). Control over the decision making will be lost.
So even if I believe that the army will be able to cover its corruption in the case of a civilian government, there is too much at stake under such a government.