Salafis: Why the surprise?
GuestThis is a guest post by Nathan Field.
One of the major themes I’ve noticed in the media after the Salafi al-Nour party won 25% of the votes in the first round of Egyptian elections was a surprise (or as in this week’s In Translation – anger). Yet their success shouldn’t be considered a surprise. Here are four points to ponder:
(1) Most popular T.V. stations to 25% of the votes isn’t a huge jump:
In 2008 Ahmed Hamam and I talked to dozens of Egyptian Salafis, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and various journalists and academics for a study on Salafi Satellite TV Stations in Egypt, published in Arab Media and Society in April 2009.
While precise Nielsen-style statistics don’t exist in Egypt, the general consensus was that Salafi-oriented TV stations such as Al-Nass and Al-Rahma, featuring charismatic preachers like Mohamed Hassan, were drawing higher ratings than any other TV stations in Egypt. So the evidence of the popularity of Salafism has been clear for years.
(2) Salafis were never against politics in theory:
Critics have accused Salafis of hypocrisy for entering electoral politics post-Revolution. An accusation that assumes Salafis were somehow “quietist” or against participation in politics on principle. This is not true; their discourse has always been “political” and entering electoral politics is a logical post-Mubarak step.
The basic Salafi worldview is that society is broken and needs to be reformed (that’s a very political statement). However, the acceptable means for achieving that reform are dictated by the situation in the society they are operating in. During the Mubarak era, Salafis judged that they couldn’t achieve meaningful reform by trying to get involved in politics, so they focused on preaching, i.e. teaching Egytians how to be better Muslims. However, post-February 2011, the equation changed and as the political process opened up, they saw an opportunity to achieve change by working within the system, and without having to compromise on their values. In fact, if they didn’t enter the political game, they would probably have lost support.
(3) Don’t underestimate the “hustle” factor:
Read this excellent article by David Kirkpatrick to understand why Salafis will continue to be a major force in Egyptian politics. In Egypt, the gaps between the different social classes are huge, culturally as much as economically and the fact is, there is often a condacscneing tendency towards the lower elements of society by those on the upper half. And that doesn’t work in the political favor of some of the Liberal Activist groups.
Egyptian liberals would be wise to study the example John Kennedy set when he won his first seat in Congress in 1952. Despite being from one of the richest and most powerful families in America, John Kennedy went door-to-door in some of the toughest neighborhoods of Boston and simply listened to what average people had to say. He figured out what they thought important and learned how to communicate effectively to people from all walks of society. Eventually (but not at first) he became as persuasive addressing a room full of factory workers as he was a group of university professors.
Stumping for votes is an essential ingredient of success in competitive democratic elections but so far the liberals have been at a serious self-inflicted disadvantage. They either focus on the biggest picture of issues (such as the constitution) that don’t resonate with most average people, or they aren’t disposed to wander through the slums asking poor people about their needs.
Bottom line: if they don’t get better on this front, they won’t be competitive in future elections. No one is entitled to votes on the basis of their ideas alone! The Salafis are significantly out-hustling the competition and that largely explains their success so far."
(4) Don’t blame Saudi Arabia – they are a genuine grassroots Egyptian movement:
Critics of Salafism like to argue that they are a “Saudi import,” usually as an attempt to discredit them. Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was asked this question at a recent conference in Washington DC and gave what I think is the best answer: there is not likely official, meaningful support from Saudi or other governments in the Gulf for the Salafis, especially for their post-February political activities. The Saudis are not in the business of encouraging other Islamist alternatives so its hard to see what they would gain. However, if the Salafis are receiving external funding from the Gulf, it would likely be from private individuals or institutions in the context of zakat.
Nathan Field is the Co-Founder of Industry Arabic.
Reader Comments (4)
Good points worth making — but I disagree with the last one: it's naive to take Khashoggi at his word, of course no Saudi foundation is state-controlled but they are controlled by princes and while it may be zakat, they play an important political role (these were the same type of foundations that donated to the Taliban, Pakistani Salafis or al-Qaeda after all). Also I do think it was surprising that most Egyptians (who presumably know their own society) did not foresee the Salafis doing better than 10% (I had arguments before the elections because I thought at least 15%, but did not expect 25% either), and that the polls did not indicate the Salafists success (because people went for household name parties like Wafd, presumably.)
I would also add that the Salafis' success may be partly based on a core base of supporters of their ideas, but overall probably has to do with the degree to which a "pro-Islam" message resonates in a media environment (under Mubarak and now) of constant mortification about conspiracies against Islam, the regional wars of the last decade, etc. It's a bit like how some American conservatives emphasize pro-business, pro-America, or pro-life beliefs — it's not like anyone is really against business, America or life. Or, in Egypt, Islam.
Hi Issandr,
Good points. It was more the way Khossogi framed his response that I was referring to.
My main point is that Egyptian Liberals who dismiss the Salafis as “ignorant” or a "Saudi import," or who try to explain their success by saying things like “there is just so much ignorance” amongst the poor are only shooting themselves in the foot.
The only way the Liberals (who tend to be more educated and affluent than the average person) are going to take votes from the Salafis is to figure out how to communicate in a language the poor can understand. Nooone is entitled to votes in a competitive democracy, and some of my Liberal friends seem to think that they because their ideas are more intellectual they “deserve” support more than the Salafis. The burden on them is to figure out how to out communicate the Salafis in places like Embaba. Won’t be easy for sure, but unless they get better, the Salafis will dominate them at the voting booth.
Nathan
The Salsa fits are political quietists in the sense that they won't get too involved unless there's a chance that the powers that prevail and must be obeyed are their own. So they are opportunists: real politicians! They just use complacency as a tactic to jump from one kind of dictatorship to the next. I can't help but see them as some kind of perverted right-wing fabians tossing democracy to the wind when it doesn't hit their dogmatic gräfenberg spot. I apologize for possibly degrading the discourse on this wonderful site.
I think the hustle factor significantly explains the liberal deficiency, but not necessarily the Salafi success. Your TV analysis here is spot on (and a wonderful link looking backwards), and to add to it their presence in mosques - Salafis connected to much of the disenfranchisement in the lower classes, especially over and above the 'middle class' Brotherhood. But you are right that liberals must get their hands dirty. It will be so funny and awkward once they start trying, I think, but it is the only way to learn their lessons. The liberals must preach - using Islam if necessary - but they must make their ideas translatable. One gets the feeling they are waiting for Islamists to discredit themselves (as Shahat and other Salafis make a habit of), but this mistakes are only preaching to the choir, and the Brotherhood (probably) won't make them. They have their work cut out for them.