The Brothers and the Interior Ministry

(Note: I just want to stress again that this story is unconfirmed — will try to add details in the next few days.)

This, if true, is scary:

Freedom and Justice Party lawmakers have asked the interior minister to devote six-month intensive courses in the Police Academy to law school graduates to help fill the national security void, security sources told Al-Masry Al-Youm Wednesday.

The MPs also asked that most of those chosen for the courses be FJP or Muslim Brotherhood members, according to the same sources. The request came during a parliamentary committee hearing with Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim over the Port Said football violence earlier this month.

That hearing was held in a closed-doors session. If this is true it looks like as well as purging the Interior Ministry of known torturers (and presumably people against the MB), they also want to make sure that in a decade’s time or so mid-ranking and senior Interior Ministry officials will be Muslim Brothers. This — appointing officials from a dominant political party and its affiliated organization — should be a top concern. There is absolutely no reason for the Interior Ministry to recruit in any other manner than an ordinary examination.

The article goes on:

The sources said that FJP members met with former Interior Minister Mansour al-Essawy when he was in office and both sides agreed that Brotherhood students should comprise 10 percent Police Academy students. Senior group leaders have denied any agreement exists.

The son of senior Brotherhood official Essam al-Erian was recently accepted into the academy.

A little caution has to be exercised here because this could very well be a counter-attack by security figures to discredit the Brothers as they try to “cleanse” the ministry — something that all political forces have asked for. But it also highlights the need for greater scrutiny of the Muslim Brotherhood, which continues to operate as a semi-secret society with no transparency on its finances and membership with little justification now.

I hold these facts (about MB and SCAF) to be self-evident

Fact: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, in its stewardship of Egypt's post-Mubarak transition, has not restored security, stability, economic growth.

Fact: The SCAF's transition plan has been so badly thought out that they have made a successful democratic transition extremely difficult, and the timeline for this transition appears still undecided.

Fact: While no political party has particularly shone during this transition, the Muslim Brothers in particular had a decisive influence in backing SCAF's transition plans from an early date.

Fact: The MB's calculations positioned it for a while as the party of stability, which voters responded well to. But now that it is elected, it is as unable to deliver stability as SCAF is.

Fact: The recent events and change in public attitudes towards SCAF — in part due to the patient work of activists – is discrediting the generals and their political allies. This cannot have escaped the MB's attention, or that of their opponents.

Fact: SCAF is on the verge of losing, if it hasn't already, whatever backing it had in the US over the NGOs affair, which is the most serious crisis in bilateral relations since the beginning of the alliance in 1975.

Fact: While the MB and the US are not natural allies, neither are SCAF and the MB. But the MB has an opportunity to be the adult in the room it claims to be here. When a MB leader like Khairat al-Shater says:

“The democratic transition in Egypt is hanging in the balance […] We strongly advise the Americans and the Europeans to support Egypt during this critical period as compensation for the many years they supported a brutal dictatorship.”

surely he can see that the SCAF is hurting Egypt's recovery by antagonizing the very allies that would provide the country with economic relief. Perhaps he should share his views with Brotherhood MPs who applaud the NGO crackdown and Mostafa Bakri's reference to foreign conspiracies.

Fact: The MB needs to strongly consider what Egypt's long-term interests are, as well as its own political interests. It can be a leader in parliament in the call for a civilian-controlled transition process by dropping its attachment to what remains of SCAF's haphazard transition plan and move closer0 to the protest movements' demands for presidential elections and a new constitution produced without SCAF. Or it can continue to defend SCAF's ongoing mistakes and accept the drip-feed of minor concessions, like shuffling former regime prisoners about in jails.

Fact: If it choses the latter, history will not remember the MB kindly.

Fact: A confrontation with SCAF is not without risks. The political unity on a transition plan that should have been there after the overthrow of Mubarak is urgently needed.

Bad Brothers

After the recent days clashes between Muslim Brothers and revolutionary activists, it might do well to reflect on the motives for the Brothers' actions. (For balance here's the MB's version of events.) There are those who see the Brothers are inherently anti-democratic and ready to settle with the military now that they control parliament. There is certainly a lot that pushes in that direction, not the least of which is the lack of a coherent cross-party platform for engaging with state institutions (including the military, security services, senior civil service, etc.) and the rivalries between various political groups.

But I still think it's too early to imagine that the MB will simply end up as the military regime's new NDP, like Sudanese Islamists were first allied and then marginalized after the military takeover. But it is absolutely stupid of them to think their mobilization of young Brothers to form a human shield against protestors (who were not, as some MB press was saying, going to "sack" the parliament building) is an appropriate way to respond. The Muslim Brotherhood's job is not crowd-control, that's something the police is supposed to do. By deploying in that capacity (rather than, say, a counter-protest that did not block those who wanted to protest in front of parliament) they are entering the party militia zone. It's a worrying sign, and the Brothers would be advised to review this kind of action (as well as some of their past statements). Protests are not about to end, and if they decide to send in their boys to block them every time, there won't only be wounded people the next time.

Khalil al-Anani has a take on this, reflecting that the MB's own authoritarianism needs to be challenged before the FJP behaves differently - Old Habits Die Hard! - By Khalil al-Anani | The Middle East Channel:

Paradoxically, despite the outright majority attained by its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the MB is still thinking and acting as an opposition movement rather than a responsible power-holder. It seems reluctant to take full power over the country or as Nathan Brown aptly puts it, "the MB confronts its success." Hence the MB's leaders are grappling with making the shift from long-standing repressed mentalities to those of statesmen, or as one of the MB's defectors has told me "they need a psychological rehabilitation" before ruling the country.

However, the question is not how the MB's leaders will rule the country but rather how will they legitimize and justify their power. The response of the MB's leadership on the disputes with other forces provides a gloomy pattern. Strikingly, the statement the movement issued on Tahrir Square's quarrel alarmed those who might disagree with its political stance. Whereas the movement should have apologized for its stark blunders over the past few months (e.g. disavowing Mohamed Mahmoud's street events, condemning Tahrir protesters during the cabinet building clashes, frequently granting the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) legal and political immunity, etc.), it defied the mounting calls for an immediate transfer of power from the military to a civilian president. Ironically, the MB's newly-issued newspaper al-hurriyya wal'adala reiterated the rhetoric of notorious public newspapers toward Tahrir's protesters when it dubbed them "anarchists [who] seek to destabilize the country."

The conformity between the MB and the SCAF in dealing with the revolution comes as no surprise due to their mutual interests. The MB seeks to consolidate the extraordinary gains it attained since Mubarak's disposal without risking its internal coherence. And the junta wants to maintain their unusual privileges without any civilian oversight. Clearly, both are exemplifying an obsolete mindset. They promote "reform" over "revolution," "stability" not "change," and "procedural" instead of "genuine" democracy. Not surprisingly, they are involved in negotiating, compromising, and brokering the future of the country behind the scene.

The Muslim Brothers and their heretics

One of the more significant developments taking place in Egyptian politics in the last few years is the fragmentation of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is perhaps part of a wider erosion of its monopoly on non-violent political Islam in Egypt. The rise of the Salafis may be a cause for concern, but the movement of young Muslim Brothers who left the Brotherhood to form their own movement, joined by major former leaders such as Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Mohammed Habib, is telling of the creation of a wider Islamist identity. And I think that's a good thing, because it dampens the authoritarianism that exists in the Brotherhood's tradition of discipline and hierarchy.

This testimony by a young former Brother is excellent, especially when talking about why he's not tempted to rejoin now that the Brotherhood is in a position to have real influence on society.

The Brothers and the Interior Ministry

An interesting tidbit from the trial of Habib al-Adly, Mubarak's interior minister, from Ahram:

Essam El-Batawi, defence lawyer for former interior minister Habib El-Adly, continued laying out his case for his client’s innocence on Tuesday, claiming that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) had planned in advance to participate in last year’s 28 January “Friday of Rage” demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in coordination with the interior ministry, with the understanding that protests would remain peaceful in nature.

According to El-Batawi, meetings were held between Brotherhood members and representatives of the State Security apparatus in the run-up to 28 January.

This is entirely plausible and consistent with everything I've known about the Brothers over the last decade. Senior leaders were in constant contact with their State Security handlers. Is this damning for the MB? Perhaps. But maybe they weren't sure what to expect, and were waiting to see what the turnout was. Certainly they very quickly sided with the new powers that be on January 29, cozying up with Omar Suleiman who dangled recognition. And then again changed their position when he was compromised, although they never explicitly called for Mubarak to step down if I remember correctly. They adapted to the situation as it evolved, and it's worth remembering many Brotherhood leaders were arrested prior to the 28th.

The question is now whether they are continuing this approach with SCAF and the new security bosses. They almost certainly are, something that makes them sellouts to many of the revolutionary groups – as the rejection of their siding with SCAF on a handover of power to civilians in July rather than immediately shows.

Pic of the day: The Ambassador and the Guide

From today's cover (top fold) of al-Tahrir newspaper, a pic of US Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson shaking hands with General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Muhammad Badie, at his offices. This is the first time a US official has met, at least in an official capacity, a General Guide of the Muslim Brothers. More on the meeting in this Ikhwanweb article. The US message seems to have been centered on concern about the Egyptian economy and the need for a quick infusion of IMF cash. The US Embassy did not issue a press release on the visit, despite its custom of doing so on other occasions – it appears the MB is more interested in publicizing this than the US. In the past few weeks, Badie has met with John Kerry, William Burns and Jimmy Carter. The US had previously avoided meeting with any senior Muslim Brothers unless they were elected MPs.

Meet Egypt's next speaker of parliament

From Profile of Dr. Mohamed Katatni, FJP's Nominee for Parliament Chairman - Ikhwanweb:

After the announcement of his win in the parliamentary seat in Minia, Katatni recalled the ironic twist after former NDP member Ahmed Ezz sarcastically prayed during the last parliamentary session that they (the NDP) succeed to take over the Muslim Brotherhood's places. Ezz's prayer could not have been more precise; the MB members were released from jails and the NDP and former regime affiliates responsible for oppressing a nation for over 30 years, are in fact sitting in their places, however, in jail.

How sweet that must feel. Me, I remember when Katatni – a decent man I have long thought respectfully of, aside from his defense of FGM in parliament – told me in 2008 that if is able to form a political party, he will quit the Muslim Brotherhood. This is the chief problem with the FJP's win for me: it's not clear whether party leaders make decisions, or the unelected leaders of the secret society (with no legal existence or accountability) that is the Muslim Brotherhood.  

Katatni will be the Speaker of the People's Assembly, and that could make him third in line for the presidency if similar provisions as the previous constitution are maintained. 

A sister on the Brothers

Don't miss this review of a new book critical of the Muslim Brotherhood's attitude to women, written by a former Muslim Sister. Noha Hennawy has the story at al-Masri al-Youm:

As the Muslim Brotherhood strives to project the image of a moderate and democratic political organization, a book featuring the angry account of a former member has hit the market.

"The Memoirs of a Former Sister: My Story with the Muslim Brotherhood" is the testimony of Intissar Abdel Moneim, an Alexandria-based novelist and author. With a compelling style and sharp language, the book takes the reader on a journey exploring the internal politics of the 83-year-old organization, placing special emphasis on discrimination against female members.

Throughout her work, Abdel Moneim decries the sisters’ internalization of oppression as women are socialized in a way that compels them to accept male dominance within the organization — and the household.

The book takes Hassan al-Banna to task for his views on polygamy, women's role in society, etc. and recounts the author's experience as a MB activist.

She goes on to criticize Banna's insistence that men and women should be separated. With a scathingly sarcastic tone, the author argues that Banna’s view portrays humans as if they are mere animals who have little control over their impulses.

“You cannot by any logic perceive all people as mere female and male sex organs that roam the streets looking for the moment of intercourse like cats," the book reads. Abdel Moneim attributes Banna’s rigid outlook to his rural background.

This outlook still shapes the group’s perception of women’s roles within the organization and in the society at large. It justifies why the Muslim Sisters' division cannot operate independently from the Brothers, why no woman is admitted into the group's highest bodies, namely the Shura Council and the Guidance Bureau, and why the group will not acknowledge a woman's right to rule, according to the book.

Read the whole thing.

A good read at a time when some MB leaders have voiced opinions that women should not take part in protests (even though some women who support the MB have been at the forefront of the recent violent protests).

On this topic, you should read the work (less hostile to MB patriarchy) of my friend Omayma Abdel Latif. Here Carnegie report on the Muslim Sisters is probably the most in-depth recent thing written on the subject.

Hamid on the MB's "Arab Calvinism"

Shadi Hamid of Brookings-Doha does some great research, but I tend to disagree with what he has written over the past year about the Muslim Brothers — I think they are much more conservative and less democratic than he gives them credit for, and strongly oppose any special relationship or particular "engagement" between the US and the MB, which he seemed to advocate in this piece last May. And I don't think they're interested in the Turkish model in any meaningful manner. But Shadi has a very nice turn of phrase in his latest Foreign Affairs piece:

In years past, the Brotherhood distanced itself from the Turkish Islamists under Prime Minister Tayyip Recep Erdogan, whom they saw as unfaithful to the Islamist program, morphing into little more than European-style conservative democrats. But having emerged from Mubarak's repression with a real chance of ruling, the Brotherhood is increasingly looking toward the Turkish model. What the Brotherhood has absorbed from Erdogan's Justice and Development Party is that strong economic growth makes everything else easier. If you raise people's living standards, they are more likely to listen to you on noneconomic matters. Perhaps more important, the Brotherhood believes Egyptians will associate any such economic success with the "Islamic project" -- a sort of Arab Calvinist dream.  

He goes on about the potential for the MB to use parliament as a counter-weight to SCAF and, eventually, the presidency as well as their institutional culture. But I find what's interesting about the economic ideas of the Brothers is actually taking place away from parliament (although they did try to introduce a business court reform bill in 2006 I believe) and in their discreet reaching out to the business community since Mubarak's overthrow. As a group of mostly economic liberals that has many entrepreneurs in its higher echelons, the MB has been experimenting with business incubators and sending reassuring messages to the business community. But it also has some odd economic ideas with roots in an Egyptian tradition of populism that cuts across the political spectrum and makes little sense today, such as, in the FJP's program, "Achieving self-sufficiency in strategic commodities, particularly of wheat and cotton."

But in many other respects they favor free entreprise, economic rule of law, help to boost SMEs and other very reasonable ideas, interwoven with some religious concepts such as makign zakat more effective, reforming the awqaf charitable foundation system and more. Do check out their program, which we've made available in English and Arabic in our documents section.

Update on Jan 1, 2012 at 17:27 by Issandr El Amrani

Faithful reader SP send this article on "Islamic Calvinism" in Turkey, showing the term has a long pedigree. Thanks!

Islamic Calvinists [PDF, 1MB]

SCAF, parliament and the next constitution

Updated on Dec 10, 2011 at 9:24 by Issandr El Amrani

I was away from Egypt for the last few days and I missed yesterday's big event: a SCAF representative invited nine foreign correspondents in what clearly was an attempt to send a message (to the US in particular) that the incoming parliament would not get to ride roughshod over the rest of the transition period, including the writing of the next constitution.

One might note several things at this juncture:

• The oddness of making this important statement — the drawing of a red line — to foreigners rather than Egyptian politicians or even the Egyptian public;
• That the SCAF has chosen to make this statement indirectly suggests it does not feel confident for a direct confrontation (as over the "supra-constitutional principles") and prefers sending signals at this state;
• That this is happening as the new government and its "council of advisors" is being composed, with this council being given powers to guide the appointment of the members of the constituent assembly (a further distancing of SCAF from direct implication in this issue after the failure of the "principles")
• The nonsensical nature of what was said — particularly the idea that the elected parliament does not represent Egyptian society, with the implication that the unelected SCAF does represent that society;
• The dueling constitutional challenges of the next few months: on the one hand, parliament seems to have the right to appoint the constituent assembly, but SCAF wants to guide the process; and on the other, SCAF seems to have the right to appoint the government, but the incoming parliament (and Tahrir) want to have a voice in that.

I've been thinking of what the larger meaning of these elections and the recent unrest in Tahrir is, and I would venture that together these mean the beginning of an end for the 1952 regime and a transformation of Egyptian politics that will be deep and meaningful:

• The Tahrir (and elsewhere) protests and Tantawi's speech showed for the umpteenth time that SCAF will capitulate to public pressure and that they lack self-confidence. It also showed that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the SCAF's management of the transition, whether or not most people want Tantawi out or not.
• The elections showed that the military's political class (what was the tanzim tali3i) has collapsed and the generals no longer have an interface to manage the country, as they did through the NDP and before it the ASU. The failure of the felool, in particular, is telling of this.

To me, whether or not the Muslim Brothers, as many fear, decide to collaborate with the SCAF for a few years is irrelevant: the military regime is over, its legitimacy spent (even if there is still much respect for the institution) and the generals' power will decline as civilian rule returns. It might take time, but I would venture that short of a new coup led by charismatic officers, the era of the generals is over. They simply don't have the competence, leadership or the "will to power" to rejuvenate and relaunch the Free Officers' regime.

Below are excerpts from several pieces reporting on the meeting, or touching on the wider issue of the SCAF-parliament relationship and the military's role in politics.

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Don't panic. Yet.

The official results of the first round of Egypt's parliamentary elections come out tonight, but a cursory look at initial results presented by parties and reported by the media paint a fairly clear picture: Islamists will be a majority in the next parliament, led by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, and Salafists have exceeded expectations to be, perhaps, the second party in Egypt.

This news has profoundly depressed most educated, middle class Cairenes I know who had hoped that the overthow of Hosni Mubarak would be followed by a relatively liberal democracy that would be inclusive of moderate Islamists. It is particularly distressing to non-Muslims, who will now fear the Islamization of public life that has taken place in the last two decades will now be accelerated, with full backing from parliament and government leaders in the next few years.

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Morning Egyptian Elections Roundup: FJP at 40%?

Updated on Nov 30, 2011 at 12:38 by Issandr El Amrani

A few selections while we await the results — nothing official has been said yet, but parties are expected to make statements this afternoon that will give an indication, and incoming reports from various governorates thus far tend to confirm the expected: the FJP as first party, Salafists often as second in the countryside. The FJP appears to be making the 40% line which was at the high end of most predictions. And this is with Cairo, Alexandria and Red Sea governorates, which could be predicted to be among the more liberal parts of Egypt.

Click to read more ...

Interview with a FJP candidate

I ran into this candidate for the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party in the working class district of Sayeda Zeinab, near a polling station. He is running as an individual candidate.

The Muslim Brothers are left behind, again

One of the interesting things about the gigantic turnout on Tahrir Square is that it is happening even as the Muslim Brotherhood has officially opposed the protests and most Salafists done the same, in the name of calming the streets before the elections. This decision is very reminiscent of January 25, when they refused to take part in the first protests leading to the overthrow of the Mubarak regime. The same goes for the Salafists, who apart from Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, have opposed protests and even tried to intervene to stop them in Alexandria yesterday.

This is not to say there are no Muslim Brothers or Salafists, or other religiously-inclined people in Tahrir today. There are.

But their leadership has failed them once more. Once again the Muslim Brotherhood has shown that its basic essence has not changed: just as its leader in 2009 said he had no problems with a Gamal Mubarak presidency and had much respect for Hosni Mubarak, just as they rushed ton negotiate with president-apparent Omar Suleiman in late January, just like they preferred to cut a deal with the military in the transition's early days and accepted a slapdash referendum and constitutional declaration, the Brothers are once again swimming against the prevailing tide of the Egyptian people. They prefer to negotiate for their own maximum advantage rather take a principled position.

I often think the Brothers' biggest problem is not that they are fundamentalist, or out of touch with the Egyptian mainstream, or too radical. It's that they are perceived, rightly, as schemers by average people. It's true of their leaders, at least, and it's what has made so many bright young people leave them in recent years and so many others doubt their intentions.

Egypt: The Sharia debate... in 1985

Hosni Mubarak in 1985

Here is a little item from history worth reconsidering in light of the growing Islamist-secularist debate in Egypt over the future constitution and the application of Sharia (referenced in Ursula’s hilarious post yesterday). From a Wikileaks State Dept. cable dated from March 1985, we get a little insight in how the American Embassy in Cairo saw Egyptian politics: a democratizing Mubarak set against retrogade political foes.

¶2. BEGIN SUMMARY. MOMENTUM IS BEGINNING TO BUILD TOWARD A MAY DEBATE IN THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY ON ISLAMIC SHARIA (KORANIC LAW). IN RECENT DAYS, KEY OPPOSITION FIGURES FUAD SIRAJ AL-DIN (CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW WAFD PARTY) AND OMAR TALMASSANI (GENERAL GUIDE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD) APPEARED BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY’S RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR PURGING OF EXISTING LEGISLATION NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHARIA. THE SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY, RIFAAT EL MAHGOUB, WHILE SUPPORTING THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE, LEFT DELIBERATELY VAGUE THE TIMING AND EXTENT OF THE PURGE. THE ADVOCATES DOUBTLESS KNOW THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING “FULL SHARIA” WILL BE PROTRACTED; INDEED, MUBARAK IS PERCEIVED AS UNCOMPROMISING IN OPPOSITION TO “THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA.” IN ADVANCE OF THE MAY DEBATE PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF, AND MANEUVERING ABOUT, SHARIA ISSUES IS ALREADY UNDERWAY. END SUMMARY.

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Column: On political alliances in Egypt

My latest al-Masri al-Youm column, about the recently announced alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd party (and others), is up. I think the whole thing is a sham, and am getting tired of such time-wasting at such a crucial moment in Egyptian politics.

Why the Muslim Brothers will brook no dissent

The news that the leading Muslim Brother Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh is being expelled from the movement should come as no surprise. It's true that in doing so, the MB is losing a widely respected figure that many see as the more moderate, acceptable face of the Brotherhood. Aboul Fotouh frequently appears on television, and has influence as the head of the Arab Medical Union, a professional syndicate. He is also a leadership figure for the vocal minority of young Muslim Brothers and their sympathizers who want to see the group change with the times. But is he becoming a major thorn in the Brotherhood's side for his desire to run for the presidency.

This is not primarily because the MB feels it is too early to field a presidential candidate, even if that's part of the picture. It is first and foremost about electoral strategy and a long-term plan to increase its political influence.

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Al-Erian demands apology from West

I've known Dr. Essam al-Erian, a prominent Muslim Brother and long one of its spokesmen, for ages. I see often for the simple reason that his office is around the corner from where I live (a small area that also includes Alaa al-Aswani's dentistry cabinet, so I have a good range of the political spectrum). He used to be known as one of the "moderate" Brothers until 2009, when it seemed he joined the more conservative faction. Since the revolution, those who know him have noted how much more abrasive he's become, and much less conciliatory in his approach to secularists. Many would say he's become quite arrogant in his public statements. 

Helena Cobban had this interview with him during which he expresses the opinion that the West (whatever that is) should apologize to Egypt. I've heard him say similar things in off-the-record situations, including get into a big row with a Western ambassador a couple of months ago. Anyway here it is:

"I am asking Europe and America for an apology. For the last 150 years they have blocked any development in this area... We believe that we have a lot to contribute to world civilization in terms of spirituality and values, but we want the help of the west in allowing our democracy to flourish. We want an apology that they supported dictatorship here for so many years, and then when the revolutions challenged the dictators, they tried to find a safe exit for some of the dictators...

"So please don't intervene in ways that corrupt our new politicians. Westerners corrupted so many of our local NGO's and even human-rights organizations in the past. (But I want to note that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch did a great job! They are my friends!)

Should the West apologize for its treatment of Egypt? Does this blaming the West amount to an exculpation of the local elites (include the likes of the MB) that are responsible for Egyptian backwardness and authoritarianism? The West contributed to the perpetuation of authoritarian regimes, but it did not create them. Following this logic, should Egypt apologize to Sudan for years of dominion? How does this work exactly?

I do agree on one thing: it'd be best for Egypt is Western governments stayed out of its affairs. It doesn't have to accept the aid, either. 

An interview with the MB's Mohamed Morsy

Mohamed MorsyFollowing a symposium in London organized by the Egyptian Community in the United Kingdom, a diaspora association of Egyptian Muslims in Britain, Arabist reader Dalia Malek had the chance to follow up with Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Council member and president of Justice and Freedom Party Mohamed Morsy and ask further questions about his lecture. She sent in this transcript of the interview and her notes on Morsy's lecture. 

As Egypt heads toward  parliamentary elections in September, the Muslim Brotherhood is spreading the word about its new party’s ideology. Justice and Freeom portray itself as working within an Islamic framework that is open to Egypt’s religious diversity, emphasizing its compatibility with religious minorities, women’s rights, and human rights.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s legislative body has delegated Mohamed Morsy to be the President of its Freedom and Justice Party, whose ambiguous distinction from the Muslim Brotherhood has been debated. Morsy is also the media spokesman and member of the Guidance Bureau.

In the lecture, Morsy repeated the Brotherhood’s claim that the party does not seek to promote a presidential candidate for the upcoming election and that it aims to gain no more than 50% of seats in Parliament.

Surprisingly, and in contrast with the recent claim that the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists have unified, Morsy stated that the party and the Salafists are distinct, noting the Salafists’ lack of political experience, and that he disagrees with the majority of their views. He referenced a Salafist leaflet that used the word “infidels” four times, depicting use of this language in a negative light.

Dalia Malek (DM): You mentioned in the lecture that an Islamic state that applies Islam properly does not currently exist. But we have seen other countries that purport to have Islamic governments implement un-Islamic ideologies and have poor human rights records. In addition to the diversity of religions in Egypt, even Muslims in Egypt cannot agree. Why do you think that this will work in Egypt?

Mohamed Morsy (MM): I was saying that in general, there is no such religious state based on a theocratic concept. There is no state in the world now that applies the meaning of “theocratic state.” What we have now is the civic state. Whether it does or does not have the flavor of religion is something else.

We cannot in reality call Muslim countries “Islamic states.” As you said, we see violations of the constitutions of those countries. But an Islamic state is by definition a modern state. It’s a civic state. You have three completely independent authorities: the parliament, the judges, and the government. Islam confirms these authorities to be independent. Also, the people are the source of power. This is also by definition Islamic.

When people have accepted the notion of Islam as a framework, violations within it will be minimized. It cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top. It has to be initiated, created, and agreed upon by the people.  

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Haenni and Tammam on #jan25 and religion

Two of my favorite commentators on religion and religious movement, Patrick Haenni and Hossam Tammam, collaborate on an excellent summary of various religious movements and institutions desultory participation in the Egyptian protest movement:

The Salafist movement condemned the protests; the Muslim Brothers first retreated, then got sucked in by the dynamism of the dispute, then tried to open up a negotiation process which the demonstrators, bolder in their demands, didn't want. Though that was not necessarily the position of all Egyptians, many of whom would have settled for a compromise, with Mubarak running the transition and the demand for democracy postponed until the next elections: the voice of the street isn't necessarily the will of the people. The Islamist groups were without doubt the most detached. Among these, various parts of the Salafist movement condemned the demonstrators very clearly from the time of the first appeals.

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