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Issandr El Amrani | Iran A very good answer to the repartee to the Iran war hawks by Bill Keller of the NYT, in this article and this blog post. Good to see this from a major figure of the NYT during the Iraq war, even if the NYT has recently misreported the state of Iran's nuclear program.
Mark Perry in Foreign Policy:
Buried deep in the archives of America's intelligence services are a series of memos, written during the last years of President George W. Bush's administration, that describe how Israeli Mossad officers recruited operatives belonging to the terrorist group Jundallah by passing themselves off as American agents. According to two U.S. intelligence officials, the Israelis, flush with American dollars and toting U.S. passports, posed as CIA officers in recruiting Jundallah operatives -- what is commonly referred to as a "false flag" operation.
The memos, as described by the sources, one of whom has read them and another who is intimately familiar with the case, investigated and debunked reports from 2007 and 2008 accusing the CIA, at the direction of the White House, of covertly supporting Jundallah -- a Pakistan-based Sunni extremist organization. Jundallah, according to the U.S. government and published reports, is responsible for assassinating Iranian government officials and killing Iranian women and children.
. . .
"The report sparked White House concerns that Israel's program was putting Americans at risk," the intelligence officer told me. "There's no question that the U.S. has cooperated with Israel in intelligence-gathering operations against the Iranians, but this was different. No matter what anyone thinks, we're not in the business of assassinating Iranian officials or killing Iranian civilians."
Wonder if that's still true. Juan Cole has more commentary reminding us that is part of a bigger pattern:
Israeli right wing governments have often been perfidious “allies.” Their political agent in the United States, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has assiduously spied on America, garnering military, technological and trade secrets. The spying is so normal that when AIPAC fired the longtime head of its Mideast bureau, Steven Rosen, was caught passing classified Pentagon documents to the Israeli embassy, he sued AIPAC on the grounds that he was only acting as AIPAC operatives routinely did, given the long history of domestic espionage conducted by that organization.
Likewise, the assassination by Mossad operatives in Dubai of alleged Hamas figure Mahmoud al-Mabhouh involved massive identity theft by Israeli agents of names, passports and other information of nationals from countries considered friendly to Israel such as Australia and the UK. 1) Identity theft is wrong. 2) Stealing another person’s identity to commit murder is wrong, both because murder is a crime and because the consequences of the murder would then fall on an innocent. 3) Israel was clearly attempting to deflect a) international blame and b) any Hamas retaliation onto the innocent citizens of countries that supported Israel. That’s about as sleazy as you can get.
Issandr El Amrani | Iran There is an avalanche of articles suggesting the possibility of war with Iran, either because the sanctions that the Obama administration (and perhaps the European Union) seek to impose will be perceived in Tehran as an act of war, for which the retaliation could be the closing of the Straits of Hormuz, or because of an attempt to destroy or set back Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program by either Israel or the US or both. The call for sanctions — overwhelmingly approved by Congress despite the hardline nature of the sanctions — comes as the P5+1 were about to resume negotiations with Iran over the nuclear issue, and only a month before Iran is set to have elections. Here's a few links — the best one being the first by Gary Sick:
The praise keeps coming in!
Rashid Khalidi, in a piece really worth reading entirely:
Dennis Ross has finally left the building. Since the Carter administration, Ross has played a crucial role in crafting Middle East policies that have prolonged and exacerbated the more than six-decade conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. His efforts contributed significantly to the growth in the number of Israeli settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories from well under 200,000 in the 1980s to nearly 600,000 today. It is in no small measure due to him that the two-state solution is all but dead.
Ross’s tenure during the administrations of five presidents over parts of five decades was marked by a litany of failures. And yet he went from success to bureaucratic success in Washington. His ability to flourish despite these failures reflects the degree to which obsequious support for Israel has become the norm in American politics, even when it contradicts U.S. national interests.
Issandr El Amrani | Iran US nuclear I could not disagree further with this (the bold bit):
If Iran does not halt its nuclear programme, its rulers should expect their country to be treated as an international pariah. That means not just pushing for more serious sanctions, but also stepping up the covert campaign to disrupt Iran’s nuclear facilities. It also means preparing for the day when Iran deploys nuclear weapons. To that end, America must demonstrate to its allies who feel threatened by Iran—not just Israel, but Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states too—that its commitment to extending nuclear deterrence to them is as firm as it was to Europe at the height of the cold war. America must also be willing to make available to its allies advanced ballistic missile defences.
Iran must be made to understand that owning nuclear weapons is a curse for it rather than a blessing. And Israel must be persuaded that striking Iran would be far more dangerous than living with its nuclear ambitions.
Overall this leader strikes the right tone, although it inverses the seriousness of the crimes: a nuclear Iran would be a breach of the NPT, but a strike on Iran is an act of war that strikes at the very foundation of the international legal system. In any case, the suggestion that the US should extend a Cold War style nuclear umbrella over the Middle East is pure folly, the exact opposite of the disengagement from the region by the US that is now necessary. Iran's nuclear program does not represent a threat in itself (few think Iran would use the bomb) but rather an increase of Iran's regional prestige and influence. It is also a reaction to a long threat of regime change against it (and the case of Libya must not be giving it confidence that giving up nuclear weapons is the right choice.)
This idea of a US nuclear umbrella, though, strikes me as deeply flawed. Who is going to pay for this nuclear umbrella? What risks will it expose the US to? What kind of overstretch will it be getting into? What does it mean in terms of the number of ships, submarines, bases, aircraft, etc. affected to the region? There were dozens of US bases across Europe providing a nuclear umbrella there. Do we really need more in the Middle East?
Issandr El Amrani | Iran nuclear So the IAEA has a new report on Iran that reveals a lot of dodgy stuff by Tehran between 1997 and 2003 and says it's quite possible work continued after 2003. At the same time we've been seeing Israeli agitation, conveniently timed to just before the report, about a pre-emptive strike. There's a lot of heat generated about this report, and it's also an occasion to revisit less-discussed aspect of this crisis: assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists (surely equally condemnable as any Iranian assassination attempts against Saudi ambassadors?), Stuxnet, Iranian deterrence options, how Iranian allies in Iraq and elsewhere might react to a crisis, etc.
I don't have anything particular to add to this debate, as my views are pretty fixed on this. Iran should respect the NPT, and me made to do so through diplomatic means. A regional grand bargain is necessary that involves the nuclear disarmament of Israel and the Middle East free of WMDs many major regional actors have advocated. Any infringement of Iranian sovereignty — missile strikes, invasion, assassinations — is unaceptable. We should also think of the consequences of the Libya war — whether it might make some "rogue states" reconsider giving up their nuclear arsenal considering what happened to Qadhafi.
Below are some links to various pieces on the issue.
We bring you another commentary piece from the Arab media in translation, courtesy of Industry Arabic, a full-service translation company founded by two longtime Arabist readers, which specializes in English-Arabic-French technical, legal, and engineering translation management services.
Fahmi HoweidyThis week I selected an article by Fahmi Howeidy, a conservative Egyptian columnist who is widely believed to be the most influential pundit in the Arab world. Howeidy is well-connected and writes for multiple audiences (he is syndicated in Egyptian papers and several Gulf-owned ones). He has long championed a kind of elitist Islamo-populism which I personally abhor, but does have some resonance in the region. At his best, Howeidy is (was?) incredibly cutting of (some of) the regimes in place; at his worst he defends silly conspiracy theories and makes crude, unsupported attacks against his ideological enemies — including at times rather nasty personal attacks.
In recent years, Howeidy had been a defender of Iran in its standoff with Israel and the United States. As the author of several books about Iran with excellent access in Tehran, he consistently defended the Islamic Republic and its foreign policy. Even when the Hizbullah and the Iranian Republican Guards were said (plausibly) by the Mubarak regime to have operated an espionage network with links to Hamas in Gaza, Howeidy slammed the Egyptian regime. This shocked many at the time, since after all covert operations had been uncovered and public opinion tended to be critical of any foreign meddling. In other words, there was a time when, for Howeidy, Iran could do no wrong.
In the column below, Howeidy reports from a conference in Tehran and slams the Iranian stance on Syria, going as far as arguing that the Islamic Republic “has lost its moral compass.” He comes out strongly against the Assad regime and makes a compelling argument that what he had admired about Assad — his commitment to the “Resistance Front” against Israel and the United States’ imperial policies in the last decade — cannot take precedence over the regimes’ murdering of its own population, and that it further risks souring that population on supporting the Resistance Front. I recommend reading alongside Rami Khouri’s latest column, on the fall of Iran’s star in the Arab world this year. Howeidy’s take may be the surest sign of this trend. Finally, his equivocating on Bahrain in the latter part of the piece is also interesting — Howeidy is not quite ready to abandon the Bahraini royals, and their Gulf allies…
The news that Egypt has arrested the brother of Sadat's assassin as he arrived at Cairo Airport is interesting:
Mohamed Shawqi el-Islambuli, brother of Khalid el-Islambuli who killed former President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, was sentenced to death in absentia in 1992 for plotting from abroad to overthrow the state.
He was sentenced again in 1999 in a landmark trial of more than 100 suspected members of the Gama'a al-Islamiya movement blamed for a massacre of tourists in the southern city of Luxor, an embassy bombing in Pakistan and a series of killings and assassination attempts including one against Sadat's successor Hosni Mubarak.
[. . .]
Islambuli returned after Iran's government told him he must leave the country and could travel either to Egypt or Pakistan. After failed attempts to enter Pakistan and Turkey, he boarded a plane to return to Egypt, said [his lawyer Nizar] Ghorab.
Aside from geopolitical differences, the biggest obstacle to the resumption of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran has been that Tehran has hosted Islambuli and named a street after his brother. The question here is why did Iran decide to kick out Islambuli, and why was he left no choice but to return to Egypt where his arrest was certain? Could this be a prelude to the resumption of diplomatic ties (which would be perfectly normal, Egypt is one of very few countries — Israel, the US — which do not have diplomatic relations with Iran)? And does Iran feel compelled to do something it failed to do for years not just because Mubarak is gone, but rather because the regional setup is changing so quickly, with Syria falling apart, Hamas perhaps on its way to deserting Damascus and Tehran and Hizbullah post-Assad perhaps being more Lebanon-centered?
Don't get me wrong: Iran is absolutely not a model for Egypt in terms of its bizarre, unelected Ayatollah-led Islamic republic, or in terms of its nasty and repressive security apparatus. But it might be in terms of economic policy, if the IMF is anything to go by. Here's a statement from the latest IMF Article IV consultation for Iran, the annual "inspection" of economic policy and performance review it does in every country:
“The mission reviewed recent economic developments and revised its macroeconomic estimates and projections in light of new data and discussions with the authorities. Real GDP growth recovered to an estimated 3.5 percent in 2009/10 despite the drop in oil prices, reflecting strong non-oil growth and an exceptional agriculture crop. The positive growth momentum continued in 2010/11. The authorities’ monetary policy successfully brought down annual average inflation from 25.4 percent in 2008/09 to 12.4 percent in 2010/11. Gross external reserves also remain comfortable with improved prospects for the external sector on the back of higher oil prices.
“The mission commended the authorities for the early success in the implementation of their ambitious subsidy reform program. The increases in prices of energy products, public transport, wheat, and bread adopted on December 19, 2010, are estimated to have removed close to US$60 billion (about 15 percent of GDP) in annual implicit subsidies to products. At the same time, the redistribution of the revenues arising from the price increases to households as cash transfers has been effective in reducing inequalities, improving living standards, and supporting domestic demand in the economy. The energy price increases are already leading to a decline in excessive domestic energy consumption and related energy waste. While the subsidy reform is expected to result in a transitory slowdown in economic growth and temporary increase in the inflation rate, it should considerably improve Iran’s medium term outlook by rationalizing domestic energy use, increasing export revenues, strengthening overall competitiveness, and bringing economic activity in Iran closer to its full potential.
Cutting energy subsidies and rationalizing other subsidies so that they target the poor better is exactly what Egypt needs to be doing. Mohamed ElBaradei is the first Egyptian politician who had the courage to bring it up, to my knowledge, in last night's appearance on the Amr Khaled "Boukra Ahla" show. Rather than borrowing money from financial institutions to finance increases in its budget, Egypt should cut the subsidies. It will be politically unpopular but it's necessary.
The previous government knew it and the next one better know it. An economic policy that delivers better social justice and poverty reduction doesn't just have to create jobs, improve infrastructure and deliver better social welfare — it also has to finance itself without systematically resorting to debt and to be efficient and fair in the way it delivers subsidies. The businessman who lives in a villa in Maadi and drives a gas-guzzling Range Rover should not be getting subsidized fuel — better to spend that money on the poor villagers who need affordable cooking gas. So perhaps there is something to learn from Iran after all.
Issandr El Amrani | Iran games Remember that post about the computer game in which you played Iranian PM Mossadegh's cat?
Well the game is now out for Mac and PC. And it's very, very, cool.
Issandr El Amrani | Iran poll From a recent RAND poll of Iranians:
- A majority of respondents view the economy as being “average” or better, though many may have hesitated to express their dismay with the economic situation.
- In general, gender and education level were important predictors of attitudes. Women and less-educated respondents tended to voice views on security and overall relations that were unfavorable to the United States. Men and those with greater social means tended to be more favorably inclined.
- A majority of respondents expressing an opinion opposed the reestablishment of ties with the United States. Women and less-educated respondents were least likely to favor the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, but those most comfortable with the survey were more likely to favor such reestablishment.
- Respondents were divided on the issue of nuclear weapons, with a significant portion favoring their development. Those most comfortable with the survey, men, and those with the highest level of education expressed the most opposition to development of nuclear weapons. The lower classes and those with the lowest level of education supported the development of nuclear weapons.
- A majority of respondents did not view sanctions as having a negative effect on the economy, though a significant number viewed sanctions as having a negative impact.Women, poorer respondents, and those most comfortable with the survey rated the impact of sanctions as most negative.
Like all surveys, take with a grain of salt. It's interesting that the higher the education level, the least in favor Iranians are of developing nuclear weapons. Perhaps it's because they understand better that, officially, Iran is not trying to develop weapons but secure its right (according to the NPT) to enrichment. Of course at the popular level on all sides of this conflict it's become about nukes, even when the real matter at hand is enrichment and inspections. I also don't quite understand why the pollster is making guesses about the willingness of Iranians to criticize the state of the economy (reported by some to be quite dire) and not take them at their word on this issue when they do on the other issues.
Issandr El Amrani | Iran saudi The WSJ has a long piece on the rivalry between Iran and Saudi that it is selling as a new Cold War. The piece covers an important topic, and makes some good points, notably on Bahrain, but has many other problems. To wit:
For decades, the two sides have carried out a complicated game of moves and countermoves. With few exceptions, both prefer to work through proxy politicians and covertly funded militias, as they famously did during the long Lebanese civil war in the late 1970s and 1980s, when Iran helped to hatch Hezbollah among the Shiites while the Saudis backed Sunni militias.
But the maneuvering extends far beyond the well-worn battleground of Lebanon. Two years ago, the Saudis discovered Iranian efforts to spread Shiite doctrine in Morocco and to use some mosques in the country as a base for similar efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. After Saudi emissaries delivered this information to King Hassan II, Morocco angrily severed diplomatic relations with Iran, according to Saudi officials and cables obtained by the organization WikiLeaks.
As far away as Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, the Saudis have watched warily as Iranian clerics have expanded their activities—and they have responded with large-scale religious programs of their own there.
A couple of things here. First — and I'm astonished how often this happens — Hassan II died in 1999. His son Muhammad VI is the king now, and was the one who decided to break relations with Iran. Secondly, while it is true that the Moroccan security services were worried about Iran (although the sudden interruption of relations, which was probably a quid-pro-quo in exchange for Saudi financial support, was widely criticised in Morocco as astoundingly petty diplomacy), they should be much more worried about Saudi Arabia's religious propaganda. Take for instance the Salafist sheikh from Marrakech who, a few years ago, advocated sex with nine-year-old girls and joked "they were better at it", and who had to flee the country to escape prosecution. Where did he go to? Saudi Arabia, which funded his activities. Where do Saudi princes come to give money to religious fanatics during the day and have sex with young girls in the evening? Morocco. A few summers ago in Rabat a story was going around that one particular Saudi prince liked to recruit teenage girls and give them 5,000DH simply to break they hymen with his finger. The Saudi royals are vile, the product of decades of excesses and unlimited wealth, a bunch of latter-day Neros but without the culture or military prowess.
Issandr El Amrani | Iran games The Cat and the Coup - Trailer from Peter Brinson on Vimeo.
Now here's an unusual computer game:
The Cat and the Coup tells the story of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran. More specifically, the game presents events from Mossadegh’s life in reverse-chronological order, beginning on his death bed following the CIA-sponsored coup d’etat in 1953. The coup was brought about by Mossadegh’s decision to nationalize Iran’s oil fields – an event I wasn’t aware of until playing the game. The game’s historical events play out in a way that takes the player back in time to the moment he was elected Prime Minister.
Issandr El Amrani | Iran I'm not sure what's the point here — that there's a nice upper class lifestyle available in Iran and not everybody is a mullah?
Mon, 14 Feb 2011 18:53:55 -0600MR. CROWLEY: Well, that – what has guided us throughout the last three months and guides us in terms of how we focus on Iran is the core principles – the Secretary mentioned them again today – of restraint from violence, respect for universal rights, and political and social reform. There is a – it is hypocrisy that Iran says one thing in the context of Egypt but refuses to put its own words into action in its own country.
QUESTION: How about other countries – Bahrain, Yemen, or Algeria, or Jordan? Why you are not talking about those countries and you are condemning what is happening in Iran?
MR. CROWLEY: Well, actually, in the other countries there is greater respect for the rights of the citizens. I mean, we are watching developments in other countries, including Yemen, including Algeria, including Bahrain. And our advice is the same. As the Secretary made clear in her Doha speech, there’s a significant need for political, social, and economic reform across the region, and we encourage governments to respect their citizen’s right to protest peacefully, respect their right to freedom of expression and assembly, and hope that there will be an ongoing engagement, a dialogue between people in governments, and they can work together on the necessary forms.
It's fine for the US to criticize Iran, but the other countries — in all of which the US has consequent military, intelligence and/or economic interests — surely deserve a mention too. What just happened in Egypt should have taught Washington a lesson about client-patron relationships in a dysfunctional region, but obviously some are slow on the uptake.
[Thanks, Nadia.]
Issandr El Amrani | #jan25 Egypt Iran Solidarity protest in Tehran on 14 February — may the Green movement get a second wind from Egypt and Tunisia!
To disgruntled Iranians, though, the sight of the Iranian government cheering on the Egyptian protesters is seen as deeply ironic. In 2009, when Iranians themselves launched massive protests against the government here, Iran's leaders labeled them "Western-backed rioters" and sent paramilitary forces wielding batons and tear gas to quash their revolt.
Still, opposition leaders are hoping to use the events in Egypt as a new catalyst, and are seeking permission from the government to launch a demonstration next Monday in the center of Tehran.
Former presidential challengers Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi said they wanted to invite people to march "to express solidarity with . . . the freedom-seeking revolts of the people of Tunis and Egypt against despotic regimes," Karroubi's Web site, Sahamnews, said on Sunday.
From Iran's opposition leaders hope to draw from protests in Egypt
THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF AHMADINEJAD’S LEBANON VISIT « The Race for Iran:
"Firstly, let us put to one side the nonsense: The President of Iran’s visit was not about embedding Lebanon as a part of the Iranian state, nor was it about paving the way for any Hizbullah ‘take-over’ of Lebanon; and nor can the visit be described as a ‘provocation’. It was of course self-evidently intended to express defiance towards Israeli military hegemony and to assert a stand of counter-deterrence to any Israeli military threat, but that it is very different from an ‘act of provocation’ deliberately intended to draw an Israeli response. All these claims for the purpose of the visit are just a part of the psychological warfare mounted against Iran, and can be ignored.The visit was, in fact, a State visit. The Iranian President was formally invited by the Maronite Christian President of Lebanon some while ago. Iran is a prominent regional state, just as Turkey is – whose Prime Minister happens to be visiting Beirut today.
Iran’s popularity on the streets should not surprise anyone. It is real, and it is heartfelt – and extends beyond the Shi’i of the south of Beirut. Having been present here in Beirut throughout the war of 2006, I experienced the almost universal shock at how leaders and so-called ‘friends of Lebanon’ such as Tony Blair and Condoleezza Rice tried to fend-off and delay a ceasefire – in order to allow Israel more time to ‘finish the job’, i.e. to destroy more bridges, more infrastructure and impose civilian casualties – as our ‘price’ to be paid for Hizbullah’s seizure of Israeli soldiers. Feelings here are still raw on this point, and all sectors of opinion know that the only real support for Lebanon in those dark hours came from Syria and Iran. Unsurprisingly, there was a direct element of gratitude in expression to Iran in recent days both for the support then, and its subsequent economic assistance to repair the damage."
Glad someone is taking the time to debunk the "who invited him anyway" line coming out in Washington. But I'll have to beg to differ about Crooke's conclusion that Ahmedinejad articulates a global revolt against market capitalism or alienated elites — not only are Iran's elites at times as alienated from ordinary people as those anywhere else, but in that country you see two rival elite clusters (broadly identified around the Rafsanjani crowd and the Republican Guards) use corruption, state control and even violence to gain control.
Note: This is much shorter version of post written earlier and then lost because of #$@^!* system. Couldn't be bothered to redo it fully.
The above pic from the Lebanese blog Beirut Spring illustrates the division about Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's visit to Lebanon today. A bunch of Lebanese bloggers have decided to note the visit with humor, like this list of 10 things to expect during the visit.
See the FT, the WSJ, Reuters, and Rami Khouri who makes some interesting points about both the domestic Lebanese reaction and the nervousness in the US and the Arab world. The State Dept's response that Ahmedinejad's visit infringes on Lebanese sovereignty is rather mind-numbing, between 2006 and now they must have grown to care a lot about Lebanese sovereignty.
My own take to the question of Iran-US relations will come in the form of this picture I took last May, near Times Square in New York. I think it explains everything pretty clearly.
;)
Worried about an Israeli attack on Iran? That’s the idea.
You must do what we can’t, because if you don’t, we will.
This is how some Israelis are trying to twist Washington’s arm to get the US to attack Iran.
A more honest way of making the argument would be to say this: If the US won’t attack Iran, then Israel will — even though it won’t accomplish its military objectives and it will open Pandora’s box. Desperate nations sometimes do desperate things. You have been warned.
Another name for this: blackmail.
It’s hard to counter an irrational argument when the irrationality is intentional. Such are the means by which someone like erstwhile Israeli army corporal and current Atlantic commentator, Jeffrey Goldberg, attempts to persuade his readers — not through cogent reasoning based on clear evidence, but by an insidious form of argument that has the clarity of slime.
Consider the way he tries to close his case for an attack on Iran — even while avoiding saying straight out that he supports such a course of action.
The United States must not take the risk of letting Israel attack Iran because if President Obama orders US forces to attack instead, this would be the most patriotic thing to do. Obama would not be serving Israel’s interests; he would be defending Western civilization.
Goldberg, of course, operates with the conceit common to many access journalists, who assume that what they’re hearing from their sources is the unvarnished truth, told to the journalist because they presumably trust him as a confidante and recognize the value of his opinions and insights. Let’s just say that such is the conceit that makes it so easy for those in power in Washington to seduce marquee name journalists to carry water for them by anointing them as “special”, cultivating in the illusion that they’re insiders privy to the inner thoughts of the key power players.
In your dreams, Jeff: The Israelis talk to you because they want to convey a particular message in Washington; and the White House talks to you because they want you to convey a particular message to the Israelis and, more importantly, to some of their most powerful backers in America.
Making Aggression Respectable | The National Interest: Here Paul Pillar makes an important point:
Perhaps one reason a prospective launching of a war against Iran has not gotten the condemnation it deserves is that the one big recent exception to the American tradition of non-aggression—the Bush administration’s war in Iraq—has shifted the terms of reference and the definition of the mainstream so much that even an offensive war has come to be considered a policy option worthy of consideration. And this has happened despite the mess in Iraq that followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein and despite George W. Bush’s restraining (to his credit, as mentioned in Goldberg’s article) of hotheads in his administration who were itching to attack Iran.
Yes you can dispute America's tradition of non-aggression, at least in the postwar era, but the fundamental point that Iran shouldn't be attacked simply because it's against international law is crucial. We have yet to deal with the illegality of Iraq's war.
Other reactions worth reading:
Did top Obama donor carry Israeli message to W.H.? Here Justin Elliott picks up on a side revelation in Goldberg's article, that a senior Israeli military official traveled to Chicago to urge one of the most important early Obama backers in the Jewish community to have a word with him.
How propagandists function: Exhibit A Gleen Greenwald.
The Leveretts, whom I don't like on Iran's internal politics, catch the same thing: THE CAMPAIGN TO TURN IRAN INTO AN “EXISTENTIAL THREAT”
Steve Clemons points out the interesting stuff about Bush being against an Iran attack late in his presidency in Jeffrey Goldberg Probes Israel's Iran Strike Option: Is Netanyahu a "Bomber Boy"?
And finally, coming back to The Atlantic, it's worth highlighting this bizarre line in this Robert Kaplan article about how to deal with a nuclear Iran:
Indeed, I would argue that because Sunni Arabs from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, and Egypt perpetrated the attacks of September 11, 2001, and because Sunni hostility to American and Israeli interests remains a conspicuous problem, the United States should theoretically welcome a strengthened Shiite role in the Middle East, were Iran to go through an even partial political transformation.
Because, of course, all Shias and all Sunnis think alike. And this article's main argument is that the US should be more willing to consider a limited nuclear war with Iran, and limited wars in general. Chilling.
Issandr El Amrani | Iran Interesting piece by Gary Sick on Iran:
The key question about Iran today is not whether it will be attacked or collapse under sanctions. It is whether Iran is capable under its present leadership to take a sober decision about how to deal with the outside world. The Revolutionary Guards have established a dominant position in Iran’s military, its economy, and its politics. Iran increasingly comes to resemble the corporatist states of southern and eastern Europe in the 1920s and ‘30s that we call fascist. Iran is conducting an interior battle with its own demons, from the millenarians on the far right who choose to believe that Khamene`i is the personal representative of God on earth, to the pragmatic conservatives who simply want a more responsible leadership, to the reformists of the Green movement whose objective is to put the “republic” back into the Islamic Republic by giving the people a greater voice.
This is a yeasty and unpredictable mix. No one knows what is going to happen next.
And this is the reality that the Obama administration must deal with. The danger is not that the administration will back the wrong horse in Iran. The real danger is that the Obama administration will be so preoccupied with domestic American politics and its constant demand to look tough when dealing with Iran that it will inadvertently rescue this cruel but hapless regime from its own ineptitude by providing a convenient scapegoat for everything that goes wrong in Iran.
I would still be cautious about a strike on Iran happening — Israel and its allies in America are as irrational as Ahmedinejad — but good to remember the dramatic internal shifts that have taken place in Iran in the last decade, empowering a new breed of plutocrats from the RGs.
