Hugh Roberts on Qadhafi and the Lybian intervention

Hugh Roberts, a great expert on North Africa (his book The Battleground, on Algeria, is a great read) is someone I've had fascinating talks about Libya over the last few months. He was very much against the intervention, disputes the urgency of the situation in Benghazi in late February, and makes the calculation that the intervention turned out much bloodier and costly for Libya than non-intervention — and has many hidden costs with regards to Libya's independence.

In a long article for the London Review of Books, he discusses all of this and revisits some personal favorites of mine: the lingering mystery over Lockerbie; Qadhafi's Africa policy, which had some positive aspects; and much more. Here's an excerpt, but do read the whole 12,500 word thing:

The situation that developed over the weekend following the initial unrest on 15 February suggested three possible scenarios: a rapid collapse of the regime as the popular uprising spread; the crushing of the revolt as the regime got its act together; or – in the absence of an early resolution – the onset of civil war. Had the revolt been crushed straightaway, the implications for the Arab Spring would have been serious, but not necessarily more damaging than events in Bahrain, Yemen or Syria; Arab public opinion, long used to the idea that Libya was a place apart, was insulated against the exemplary effect of events there. Had the revolt rapidly brought about the collapse of the regime, Libya might have tumbled into anarchy. An oil-rich Somalistan on the Mediterranean would have had destabilising repercussions for all its neighbours and prejudiced the prospects for democratic development in Tunisia in particular. A long civil war, while costly in terms of human life, might have given the rebellion time to cohere as a rival centre of state formation and thus prepared it for the task of establishing a functional Libyan state in the event of victory. And, even if defeated, such a rebellion would have undermined the premises of the Jamahiriyya and ensured its demise. None of these scenarios took place. A military intervention by the Western powers under the cloak of Nato and the authority of the United Nations happened instead. 

How should we evaluate this fourth scenario in terms of the democratic principles that have been invoked to justify the military intervention? There is no doubt that many Libyans consider Nato their saviour and that some of them genuinely aspire to a democratic future for their country. Even so I felt great alarm when intervention started to be suggested and remain opposed to it even now despite its apparent triumph, because I considered that the balance of democratic argument favoured an entirely different course of action.

Comments

[Kankuro]

Amazing an incredibly well written piece, perhaps his eloquence and the expansive scope of the article obscure Roberts' discounting (just like everybody else) of some things which don't suit his line.
i.e. weren't the claims that government forces had used anti aircraft guns and other heavy weapons on peaceful protesters arguably more important in the narrative of de-legitimising Ghadaffi, and those were backed up by phone footage and multiple independent testimonies (as far as I remember).
Also his assessment of the state under Ghadaffi is incredibly insightful and beautifully written, but neglects to mention (when talking about the distribution of oil revenues to the betterment of the population) the neoliberal phase in which Libya, in Saudi style, effectively imported large sections of its working and middle classes at the same time as having very high unemployment especially among the young.

His central claims that
1. the evidence for a potential massacre in Benghazi (and thus a pretext for the intervention) was at best
not as clear as reported, and at worst the result of a convergence of thinking between the leaders of the rebellion and the pro intervention elements in NATO countries.
2. NATO (and the NTC/or elements of?) cut off any chance of a peaceful resolution after Ghadaffi had complied with Resolution 1973 and announced a ceasefire on march 18th. Khalifa Haftar (ex Virginia resident and alleged CIA affiliate) on behalf of the NTC, rejected the offer and was backed up by NATO governments..."‘We will judge him by his actions not his words,’ David Cameron declared, implying that Gaddafi was expected to deliver a complete ceasefire by himself: that is, not only order his troops to cease fire but ensure this ceasefire was maintained indefinitely despite the fact that the NTC was refusing to reciprocate." So NATO and the NTC (or substantial elements of) effectively prolonged the military conflict, resulting in the loss of perhaps thousands of lives, If true this is utterly terrible and despicable.

I have no idea how much of this is true or not. It will be interesting to see if Robert's version of events can be backed up,
for instance, were rebels fired on enough to cause them to reject the ceasefire, or did khalifa just reject it out of hand.
Certainly if true and widely known, this would be devastating for the NTC (and those liberals and leftists who enthusiastically supported the intervention). But I imagine these questions will take long enough to answer that they wont be widely known when they are. Ant the bit at the end about the result essentially being the restoration of a modernised ancien regeme is the most depressing thing i can remember reading about this whole affair.

[Brian O.]

I'm late joining this discussion, but in the hope that someone is still interested, I will make a comment.
Frankly, I was appalled by this piece. As you say Roberts writes well, and his analysis of the Gaddafi regime demonstrates his knowledge and scholarly credentials. But the rest of the article is at best specious and at worst illogical and one-sided.
On your two points: the ramifications for Benghazi if there was no intervention were certainly exaggerated by those who wanted to make a case for the no fly zone. But there was a real and substantial danger. After all the security forces had killed over 170 in the initial four days of largely unarmed protests. There is a debate to be had about what level of threat (if any) justifies external intervention, but to have that debate you need to start with respect for the facts..
With regard to your point 2: I think its important to note that Gaddafi did not offer a ceasefire(ie subject to negotiation with the other side); Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa announced on 18 March that all military operations would cease immediately. But in the real world Gaddafi was playing a different game : on the 17th he made a radio broadcast directed at Benghazi warning them that his forces would arrive in the city that night and would show no mercy; the "ceasefire" hardly caused them to pause for breath - in the hours following its announcement his forces moved forward to the outskirts of Benghazi and on the morning of the 19th - less than 24 hoursafter the "ceasefire" was proclaimed- began shelling the city. To get the flavour of what Gaddaafi's "ceasefire" looked like on the ground elsewhere, try this excerpt from Amnesty International 's May report on Misrata:
"A 25 year-old man, interviewed by Amnesty International in a clinic in Sfax, told theorganization that he sustained shrapnel injuries in his right knee during the same demonstration on Tripoli Street on 21 March. He said that protesters marched from Abdelaziz Street to the People’s Congress locale on Tripoli Street, convinced that the pro-Gaddafi forces will not shoot at them following Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi’s declaration of a ceasefire in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1973. He estimated that some 5,000 people participated in the protest, including children as young as eight. He said that forces loyal to Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi opened fire at about 1.30pm, using weapons not designed for crowd control, including machine guns, RPGs and antiaircraft machineguns – allegedly of 14.5mm and 24mm calibre. He also said that the he saw snipers shooting at protesters from the roofs of buildings on Tripoli Street."

Why the regime behaved in this way is a speculative question open to various possible answers. But Roberts own analysis of the nature of the regime and its highly personalist character shows why it would have been almost impossible to negotiate a meaningful ceasefire. The idea of negotiating a peaceful transition is utterly absurd. You could argue that the intervening powers should have tried more systematically to open negotiations before launching airstrikes, but the UN was in regular contact with the Libyan government at this time and repeatedly specifying what Libya had to do to comply with 173, and Benghazi was already under attack when the airstrikes were launched. I can't see t that the responsibility for this lies with anyone but Gaddafi.