Friday
May082009
Salafists and satellite media in Egypt
Issandr El Amrani
There's a very interesting article at Arab Media and Society on Salafi satellite TV in Egypt, looking at Salafist satellite television stations, their popularity, and what impact they are having on society and politics. Its conclusion is that Salafist stations are not the cause of quietist apolitical views, and that the Muslim Brothers' experience since 2006 and the pushback from the state against their political success at the ballot box may be where to look. I'm no so sure about that, but this is very interesting venture into the world of non-jihadi Salafi media.
Via Arabic Media Shack, where I left a comment on the article.
Since the Egyptian government does not allow the more politically-active Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) to base their own satellite stations in the country, some critics claim that this is part of a strategy to cultivate Salafism as a counterweight to the Brotherhood. According to Egyptian novelist and cultural commentator Alaa Aswany, “the political quietism of the Salafis and their injunctions to always obey the ruler are too good an opportunity for established Arab rulers to pass up,” adding that Salafism is “a kind of Christmas present for the dictators because now they can rule with both the army and the religion.”
Yet outside of these dramatic claims – usually made by non-Islamists writing in opposition newspapers – there has been little in-depth study of the issue, and nothing in English. We attempt to rectify this situation by addressing two questions: To what extent, if any, is the popularity of Salafi television a reflection of the rise of a distinctly more puritanical form of Islamism in Egypt? And to what extent, if any, are these stations a tool in a competition between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood? We base our study on extensive interviews with Egyptian and American experts, a survey of the available written Arabic language material and our personal viewing of the stations. Given our research limitations, we do not believe that the presence and popularity of Salafi television is causing Egyptians to become more conservative in their religious beliefs nor is it part of a government strategy of cultivating Salafism as a counterweight to the Muslim Brotherhood, as Aswany claims. Rather, its popularity is best viewed, mundanely, as reflecting a logical shift towards more puritanical interpretations of religion, across broad segments of society, in response to specific economic, cultural and political developments.
Via Arabic Media Shack, where I left a comment on the article.
Reader Comments (8)
Arabist,
The focus on the Brotherhood in your comment here, I think, skews the emphasis of our conclusions. Our conclusion was this:
"its popularity is best viewed, mundanely, as reflecting a logical shift towards more puritanical interpretations of religion, across broad segments of society, in response to specific economic, cultural and political developments."
In our conclusion section we pointed to three developments, economic, cultural, and political that we believe are causes of the increasing popularity of Salafism in Egypt. However, we didn't say that any was more important than another and we also didnt focus on the political aspect more than the economic or cultural factors. So just to be clear, the political aspect, as relates to the Ikhwan, was, at most, 1/3 of our conclusion.
Thanks for theclarification! I focused on it because it came atthe end. Can you elaborate on the cultural and social factors - although of course the availability / spread of salafist media is in itself a cultural factor! But the idea that increased conservatism came through a variety begs the question, which was dominant, or what was the main source of this change - many say for instance it was the mass immigration to the Gulf, others the post-1967 \"failure of the Arab modernist project\", yet others the political manipulation of Islam by the regimes, and in some countries a reaction to the loss of authority of traditional ulema, either because they were coopted by the state or failed to come up with a compelling vision of Islam's role in the modern post-colonial polity. I'm sure there are many others. Your article really generates some interesting ideas, and personally I think the agency behind \"scientific salafism\" - availability of funds from Gulf foundations, political backing, etc. - is a very important element.
th
Nathan had a problem with the comments system and asked me to post this for him:
\"\"\"Thanks for the comment. Which elements are most imporant is definetely something we will look into but it may be that they are all equally important.
The key point is that Salafism means different things to different people. For some, the attraction is cultural. For example, when Egyptians turn on a tv and see themes and messages that are an affront to their values (but werent so pervasive before the age of Satelite and the internet) they retreat to what's familiar-- their culture. So for many, Salafi TV represents the most authentic expression of Islamic culture. And this likely explains why there are people from affuent classes with nothing \"wrong with their lives\" who watch Salafi TV.
The second factor is economic. The popularity of Salafism is greatest amongst the poorer classes. Most Egyptians barely struggle to get by and see no hope for improvement in the future. People look to religion for answers about their predicament and to give them a guide to follow. But when some guy in Embaba turns on the TV and hears some preacher saying things like \"we're gonna go out and have a protest\" or \"give some detailed critique of Egyptian economic policy\" that doesn't have a whole lot of immediate relevance. For a guy who makes 120 pounds a month and has to support three kids its not especialy relevant. Therefore, literal and more absolutist interpretations are likely to have more relevant answers to the predicament he faces on a daily basis.
Finally, there is the political dimension. Perhaps it better to think of the Ikhwan and Salafis as approaches and not movements. On this basis, a major distinction between the two is that one plays politics and the other does not. But what has the political game achieved for the MB lately? Not much. So if you have one approach prove to be ineffective, it is only logical that some will start saying \"geee, maybe we should try something new.\" We shouldn't think of this as people giving up their membership cards in one movements and joining another -- the lines between the two are blurry. But if segments of the Ikhwan are saying \"lets get back to basics and not focus on the complicated political stuff,\" and instead focus more on Da'wa and teaching, they are essentially becoming more Salafi.
Immigration to Saudi Arabia and the failure of the Arab modernization project has been going on for decades. So has the decline of the Ulema but not all. There are credible indepndent clerics out there-- such as Al-Qaradawi, so its not as if people are turning to Salafism because its the only alternative. Moreover, the appeal of Salafism is according to several, strongest in the Northern cities-- but not the Saiid, although the Saiid has provided much of the labor to Saudi Arabia. So this seems to suggest that Saudi factor isn't the critical one.
This Salafi trend is something new thats really taking form over the last 5-10 years. What explains that it only became profitable for TV stations to go Salafi in the last 3 years or so? Why not before? We believe the three developments we point to explain this timing.\"\"\"
Nathan had a problem with the comments system and asked me to post this for him:
\"\"\"Thanks for the comment. Which elements are most imporant is definetely something we will look into but it may be that they are all equally important.
The key point is that Salafism means different things to different people. For some, the attraction is cultural. For example, when Egyptians turn on a tv and see themes and messages that are an affront to their values (but werent so pervasive before the age of Satelite and the internet) they retreat to what's familiar-- their culture. So for many, Salafi TV represents the most authentic expression of Islamic culture. And this likely explains why there are people from affuent classes with nothing \"wrong with their lives\" who watch Salafi TV.
The second factor is economic. The popularity of Salafism is greatest amongst the poorer classes. Most Egyptians barely struggle to get by and see no hope for improvement in the future. People look to religion for answers about their predicament and to give them a guide to follow. But when some guy in Embaba turns on the TV and hears some preacher saying things like \"we're gonna go out and have a protest\" or \"give some detailed critique of Egyptian economic policy\" that doesn't have a whole lot of immediate relevance. For a guy who makes 120 pounds a month and has to support three kids its not especialy relevant. Therefore, literal and more absolutist interpretations are likely to have more relevant answers to the predicament he faces on a daily basis.
Finally, there is the political dimension. Perhaps it better to think of the Ikhwan and Salafis as approaches and not movements. On this basis, a major distinction between the two is that one plays politics and the other does not. But what has the political game achieved for the MB lately? Not much. So if you have one approach prove to be ineffective, it is only logical that some will start saying \"geee, maybe we should try something new.\" We shouldn't think of this as people giving up their membership cards in one movements and joining another -- the lines between the two are blurry. But if segments of the Ikhwan are saying \"lets get back to basics and not focus on the complicated political stuff,\" and instead focus more on Da'wa and teaching, they are essentially becoming more Salafi.
Immigration to Saudi Arabia and the failure of the Arab modernization project has been going on for decades. So has the decline of the Ulema but not all. There are credible indepndent clerics out there-- such as Al-Qaradawi, so its not as if people are turning to Salafism because its the only alternative. Moreover, the appeal of Salafism is according to several, strongest in the Northern cities-- but not the Saiid, although the Saiid has provided much of the labor to Saudi Arabia. So this seems to suggest that Saudi factor isn't the critical one.
This Salafi trend is something new thats really taking form over the last 5-10 years. What explains that it only became profitable for TV stations to go Salafi in the last 3 years or so? Why not before? We believe the three developments we point to explain this timing.\"\"\"
A couple of points on salafism and the MB, though I don't really know enough about the very recent developments to comment on the overall article.
One, the original article gets the difference between the traditional approaches of MBs to sharia a bit wrong - they were always pro-ijtihad based on Quran and Sunna and Hasan al-Hudaybi actually clashed with the Azharis for being more fiqh oriented, and it was a source of tension when the two sides offered their own proposals for sharia implementation at various points.
Two, the MB have gone back and forth between political engagement and a 'return to dawa' at various points in the last 30-40 years, but return to dawa has not necessarily meant a rapprochement with the newer, more pietist dawa groups like the Gama Shara'iyya, etc, and I always find it a bit problematic to assume the salafi dawa movements and MB dawa mission overlap harmoniously. The MB have traditionally preferred a more ideological, disciplined Islamist ideology (sometimes emphasizing movement discipline over mission achievement), and have often differed with some of the salafi groups on political activism and projects for macro social reform. Even on the dawa mission there seems to be some mutual professional jealousy. Some of the more activist and political MB leaders sometimes sneer quite openly at the salafi groups for their quietism - rhetoric about how they are glad to work with anyone who works for Islam notwithstanding.
Is interesting to learn about the new salafi stations and so on, thank you for that. As for the recent profitability of salafi stations, I'd want to know about developments in the television market, production costs, market segmentation, cable channel bundling and so on to understand why they're more profitable these days. And from the Gulf side of things, whether those funding salafi stations do so because backing a satellite channel is what you do as a man of influence, in the same way you would have funded a newspaper back in the day.
Good points Bint Manga. My impression is that on the da'wa side there is rivalry between the MB and groups like Gamaa Shaariya, which today may very well be wealthier and more influential than the MB. It was said after the Duweiqa rockslide last October that Gamaa Shaariya got there before the MB (and the govt.) with rescue efforts - contrast with 1992 earthquake. But a related question is whether, in its da'wa approach, the MB might be adopting some of the same positions (theologically etc.) as Salafi groups. In other words, what's the response from operating in a more competitive environment? Or has the environment always beencompetitive(gamaa islamiya, islamic jihad, other small Islamist groups such as those that were widespread in the 1970s and 1980s, and may still be today?) Have we taken the MB's dominance of the Islamist field in Egypt for granted because of their high media visibility and political participation?
True, and perhaps you'd have to talk to the more grassroots MB dawa guys to get a sense of whether they're changing tactics in response to the success of more salafi dawa movements. But then again, the competition has been around for a good 30 years, so I'm curious to know what has really changed this time round, whether smaller groups are better able to raise money because they face fewer govt security restrictions than Brothers, or whether they are genuinely outpacing Brothers on dawa and relief work. Or whether people who earlier supported Brothers for their religious work are getting sick of seeing them invest so much in politics.