8:52PM
Ayman Nour & the struggle inside the NDP
By 
Charles Levinson | Egypt
Charles Levinson | Egypt
Sorry for my erratic presence of late. I was in the US for a stretch and was a bit overwhelmed upon my return to Egypt, thus had little time to post. Anyway, I missed out on much of the Hizb al Ghad fun, so I'd like to chime in, if a bit late.
When Hizb al Ghad was approved by the political parties committee there was much speculation about why it had succeeded where so many others had failed, including Al Ghad itself on a number of occasions. Why had Safwat al-Sherif, head of the Political Parties Committee and hardly a proponent of multi-party democracy in Egypt, suddenly warmed to Nour's venture? One of the more widely circulated, though not very convincing, theories was that there was a deal between Ayman Nour and the regime, wherein Nour agreed not to oppose another term for Mubarak in exchange for a license for his political party. Nour's arrest, the theory goes, was a result of Nour's backtracking on this deal. Other's have portrayed Nour's arrest as the beginning of a clampdown on, and a warning to, an increasingly bold opposition. Accordingly, his arrest has been portrayed as a victory for the NDP old-guard, the aging anti-reform lions embodied by the likes of Safwat al-Sherif and Kamal al-Shazli, and a blow to the progressive, reformists of the Gamal Mubarak wing.
Or is just the opposite true?
Another theory worth chewing on has been making the rounds, though I have yet to see it written about in the press here. A handful of astute observers with long experience in the ranks of the opposition here are convinced that the rise and fall of Ayman Nour is a result of the internal struggle occurring inside the NDP. However, it’s argued, Nour threatens Safwat al-Sherif far less than he threatens the Gamal Mubarak wing of the NDP, which is playing to position itself as the only viable alternative to succeed Hosni Mubarak. So Safwat al-Sherif approves Hizb al-Ghad, a liberal, pragmatic, reasonably pro-US party with a plan, thus dealing a blow to Gamal Mubarak and gang by providing the very thing they fear the most: an alternative (Remember, Madeleine Albright, during her recent visit here, said that the US would gladly support Egypt’s opposition were there a credible opposition.). Nour's arrest on trumped up charges, they argue, has been the response from Team Gamal.
As a sidenote, such reasoning has implications on why we have witnessed a relative increase in political freedoms of late-- anti-Mubarak protests, new political parties, self-declared presidential candidates, etc. The conventional wisdom is that this is because Egypt is caught between pincers, increasing internal discontent and opposition spurred by deteriorating economic circumstances on one side, and post-9/11 US-led foreign pressure to democratize on the other. If we are inclined to accept the above mentioned theory, however, then we should consider a third factor: that the political opening is a product of a measure of instability inside the regime as two factions compete for control. The opposition is allowed greater space because each NDP faction hopes to use the opposition to weaken the other. Perhaps a historical parallel could be drawn with the political tolerance shown by Sadat in his first couple years after succeeding Nasser, before he consolidated power.
When Hizb al Ghad was approved by the political parties committee there was much speculation about why it had succeeded where so many others had failed, including Al Ghad itself on a number of occasions. Why had Safwat al-Sherif, head of the Political Parties Committee and hardly a proponent of multi-party democracy in Egypt, suddenly warmed to Nour's venture? One of the more widely circulated, though not very convincing, theories was that there was a deal between Ayman Nour and the regime, wherein Nour agreed not to oppose another term for Mubarak in exchange for a license for his political party. Nour's arrest, the theory goes, was a result of Nour's backtracking on this deal. Other's have portrayed Nour's arrest as the beginning of a clampdown on, and a warning to, an increasingly bold opposition. Accordingly, his arrest has been portrayed as a victory for the NDP old-guard, the aging anti-reform lions embodied by the likes of Safwat al-Sherif and Kamal al-Shazli, and a blow to the progressive, reformists of the Gamal Mubarak wing.
Or is just the opposite true?
Another theory worth chewing on has been making the rounds, though I have yet to see it written about in the press here. A handful of astute observers with long experience in the ranks of the opposition here are convinced that the rise and fall of Ayman Nour is a result of the internal struggle occurring inside the NDP. However, it’s argued, Nour threatens Safwat al-Sherif far less than he threatens the Gamal Mubarak wing of the NDP, which is playing to position itself as the only viable alternative to succeed Hosni Mubarak. So Safwat al-Sherif approves Hizb al-Ghad, a liberal, pragmatic, reasonably pro-US party with a plan, thus dealing a blow to Gamal Mubarak and gang by providing the very thing they fear the most: an alternative (Remember, Madeleine Albright, during her recent visit here, said that the US would gladly support Egypt’s opposition were there a credible opposition.). Nour's arrest on trumped up charges, they argue, has been the response from Team Gamal.
As a sidenote, such reasoning has implications on why we have witnessed a relative increase in political freedoms of late-- anti-Mubarak protests, new political parties, self-declared presidential candidates, etc. The conventional wisdom is that this is because Egypt is caught between pincers, increasing internal discontent and opposition spurred by deteriorating economic circumstances on one side, and post-9/11 US-led foreign pressure to democratize on the other. If we are inclined to accept the above mentioned theory, however, then we should consider a third factor: that the political opening is a product of a measure of instability inside the regime as two factions compete for control. The opposition is allowed greater space because each NDP faction hopes to use the opposition to weaken the other. Perhaps a historical parallel could be drawn with the political tolerance shown by Sadat in his first couple years after succeeding Nasser, before he consolidated power.
Reader Comments (14)
Thanks for the interesting perspective.i have a question here, regarding the second theory. If Safwat al sherif is supporting an alternative to the Gamal gang, is it necessary for thet alternative to be from outside the NDP? are their any other NDP serious contenders for the Mubarak job? where does Omar suleiman stand in all this.
Thanks
Sam
Fascinating. One can't call this kind of analysis "Egyptology," unfortunately, as the name is already taken.
Fascinating scenarios but they're simply too good to be true.
There is no power struggle stuff here. Safwat El-Sherif -like Omar Suleiman- get their orders from Mubarak himself. Al-Ghad was technicaly approved by Safwat but we know too well none of this is in his hands. Mubarak remains the one and only (with the help of Gamal).
Fascinating analysis!
It may have been that Mubarak the father was looking for an opening to have his son rise to power without the in-your-face approach witnessed in Syria. Thus the idea was to allow the AlGhad party to come to the scene and allow Mubarak the son to enter into a competition with Ayman (Gamal and Nour about the samer age). However, this idea must have been abandoned following the realization that Ayman is truly popular (at least among his constituency), hence Ayman waas arrested!
Could it possible be that Gamal Mubarak wants to get rid of the aging NDP and all the problems it is creating for him re/ his possible rise to power and decided to join Hizb al-Ghad?
Q: is it normal for Mubarak to send his son to things like http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=12751">this?
Egyptology
Charles Levinson peers through the fog of Egyptian politics and speculates on how Mubarak succession maneuvering might be playing a role in the Ayman Nour case
This would generally fit the idea that the Policies Secretariat is more or less in power and fighting off challenges.
If this is the case (and I think it is entirely plausible) then the battle for Egypt's presidential succession is already over.
I've heard the second theory before from a friend who is normally very well informed, but I have a hard time buying that Safwat Al Sherif actually has much power these days. I think this division in the NDP thing is mostly a diversion, the real division is between the NDP (headed by Gamal with the help of the likes of Safwat Al Sherif these days, even if they've been demoted) and, if he's not careful, the army. That Safwat approved Al Ghad without Gamal or Hosni's consent (even though he is technically empowered to do so) is granting him too much power.
I totally agree with issander. I am convinced that its is a gem between the NDP and the army, and that Omar Suleyman is the real chalenger to Gamal out of his military background. So in a way, if Gamal becomes president I think the regime will be weakened, since the army and many of its influancial Lewa's will not be happy and as supportive as they are now. And a weak regimes offers more possibilities for change....
The assumption is that Safwat Al Sherif, Omar Suleiman, and the Army are all more or less on the same side in the NDP power struggle. That would also explain how Safwat al Sherif (who I agree is not powerful enough to act alone on this) could have gotten Al Ghad licensed.
Regime openings during elite conflict go back to Sadat, but occurred much earlier as well, under Nasser in 1954 and 1968. -Jason
i have been in the army.the military officers still believe they are the rulers of egypt.i disagree with them.the civilians must be in charge,i vote ayman nour
Ayman nour has to be freed mubark is so unjust.